stating that, when a trial court’s “inherent, discretionary authority to wield its statutorily prescribed sentencing powers [has been] supplanted, abrogated, or otherwise limited,” a defendant’s challenge to a mandated sentencing feature implicates the legality of that sentence
How later courts described this case
- stating that, when a trial court’s “inherent, discretionary authority to wield its statutorily prescribed sentencing powers [has been] supplanted, abrogated, or otherwise limited,” a defendant’s challenge to a mandated sentencing feature implicates the legality of that sentence
- cautioning that the approach of redefining the concept of an illegal sentence to encompass all sentencing claims other than those challenging purely discretionary aspects effectively disapproves decades of existing Superior Court precedent and unduly overrides salutary issue preservation requirements across a broad array of sentencing challenges
- stating that a challenge to the imposition of a mandatory -4- J-A32029-17 minimum sentence constitutes a challenge to the legality of a sentence
- explaining that at least “[a] classic claim of sentencing ‘legality’ . . . may be raised sua sponte”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I agree with the lead Justices that Appellee’s sentencing challenge should be vindicated, regardless of the issue-preservation difficulty. To the degree their opinion reflects that review of legality-of-sentence claims has been made available in limited categories of cases beyond those involving claims *540 that sentences exceeded statutory máximums — despite non-adherence to ordinary principles of issue preservation and presentation — I support its reasoning and holding.
To the extent, however, the lead opinion conceives a rule of general application and/or sanctions, as the reviewability litmus, application of the dichotomy between claims of legal error and discretionary aspects of sentencing as embodied in Section 9781 of the Sentencing Code, I hold a different view similar to that of Mr. Chief Justice Castille.
In many jurisdictions, the doctrine of plain error serves as a safety valve to allow the vindication of compelling claims for relief from criminal sanctions, where the interests of justice require, despite failures to raise and preserve them. See, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). See generally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 767 (2005). This Court generally disapproved plain error in Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 423 , 326 A.2d 272, 274 (1974); however, some vestiges do remain. Of relevance here, before and after Clair , Pennsylvania courts recognized a continuing availability of judicial review where a sentence is “unlawful per se.” Commonwealth v. Rispo, 222 Pa.Super. 309, 311-12 , 294 A.2d 792, 794 (1972), followed by Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 330-331 , 362 A.2d 227, 230 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 465 , 485 A.2d 1098, 1099 (1984). The use of the “per se ” limiting language was obviously intended to narrow the class of claims subject to continuing review beyond those merely embodying purely legal issues.
The “per se ” language, however, was imprecise, perhaps necessarily. Further, in the aftermath, courts did not always use this limiting language. On the one hand, “unlawful per se ” was often shorthanded to “illegal,” thus opening the possibility for reading the maxim as applying to a far broader category of cases. On the other hand, courts attempted to confine the precept very narrowly to claims that a sentence exceeded a statutory maximum. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 541 Pa. 531, 562 , 664 A.2d 1310, 1325 (1995) (“As long as the sentence is within the statutory limit, it is legal.”), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Freeman, *541 573 Pa. 532, 560 , 827 A.2d 385, 402 (2003). Of course, this latter class of statements conflicts with the body of decisions recognizing other instances where review should be accorded. See Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, at 336-37.
I believe the “illegal per se ” language, although imprecise, better captures the thrust of the limited waiver exception pertaining to criminal sentencing, while distinguishing the analysis from the legality/discretion dichotomy governing the presentation of appellate claims under the Sentencing Code. I also agree with Chief Justice Castille that assessment of whether additional categories of claims will qualify is necessarily an evaluative one — which must account for the interest of finality in the administration of justice — in addition to fundamental fairness to the defendant. The appropriate balance of these important interests remains a difficult subject, upon which reasonable minds often disagree.
Here, I believe a sentence imposed pursuant to a statutory mandatory minimum requirement which, by its plain terms, simply did not apply should be regarded as structurally illegal per se. In the circumstances, it seems a modest imposition on the government for Appellee’s sentence to be revisited so that the due consideration of his individual circumstances may be afforded, within the sound discretion of the common pleas court.