explaining that “[a]ppellant . . . was entitled to know, upon filing her motion to quash, which monthly staffing report the State was relying on to prosecute her” and “[t]he State was obligated, upon demand by motion to quash, to inform appellant of the persons whose names she falsely entered on the reports and the dates on which she falsely reported them as working, in order to identify the alleged criminal acts”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[a]ppellant . . . was entitled to know, upon filing her motion to quash, which monthly staffing report the State was relying on to prosecute her” and “[t]he State was obligated, upon demand by motion to quash, to inform appellant of the persons whose names she falsely entered on the reports and the dates on which she falsely reported them as working, in order to identify the alleged criminal acts”
- concluding that trial court should have granted motion to quash because indictment failed to specify which monthly staff report formed basis for charge for tampering with government record when defendant routinely prepared those types of reports for years
- finding that in prosecution for tampering with a government record, sufficient notice identifying the alleged criminal acts required the State to identify the specific names “falsely” entered and supporting the tampering charge
- holding trial court erred in denying motion to quash because indictment failed to specify monthly staffing report on which State relied in prosecution for tampering with government record, where defendant routinely prepared and filed such reports
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DALLY, Judge,
dissenting.
Error such as a court not obtaining jurisdiction because an indictment fails to allege an essential element of an offense may be raised for the first time post trial, but other defects in the indictment must be raised prior to trial by an objection specifically pointing out the alleged defect.
The majority hold that “the indictment in this case fails to meet . . . basic notice requirements” and the opinion also quotes the pretrial objection made in a motion to quash that the indictment was “vague and ambiguous.”
The error, if any, in this indictment was not so fundamental that it failed to give the trial court jurisdiction. The pretrial objection made is not sufficiently specific to point out the deficiencies which the majority now find in the allegations of the indictment.
I dissent.
DOUGLAS, TOM G. DAVIS and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., join in this dissent.