holding that compromise settlement agreement made while workers’ compensation case was pending and approved by court was valid accord superseding original claim, was subject only to judicial cancellation for fraud or other equitable grounds, and was binding on both plaintiff and defendant
How later courts described this case
- holding that compromise settlement agreement made while workers’ compensation case was pending and approved by court was valid accord superseding original claim, was subject only to judicial cancellation for fraud or other equitable grounds, and was binding on both plaintiff and defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION
HIGHTOWER, Chief Justice.
I disagree with that part of the opinion of the majority of the court which holds that the court below did not err in entering judgment for appellee based upon the so-called “compromise settlement agreement”. As a matter of justice, I would apply the same principles of law in construing the binding effect of said agreement, under the facts of this case, as are applicable to judgments by consent.
The plaintiff is here seeking his right to try his suit before a jury. It has been held by the Supreme Court that:
“A valid consent judgment cannot be rendered by a court when consent of one of the parties thereto is wanting. It is not sufficient to support the judgment that a party’s consent thereto may at one time have been given; consent must exist at the very moment the court undertakes to make the agreement the judgment of the court.” (Emphasis added) Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333 , 240 S.W.2d at p. 291 ; 33 Tex.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 103 et seq.
On the original hearing of March 30th referred to in the majority opinion the court only made this docket entry: “Jury selected and sworn; plaintiff begins testimony. Parties announced settlement and jury discharged at 3:50 P.M.” The court made this statement: “All right, I will approve the settlement.” It is clear that such statement of the trial judge was entirely prospective in the sense that he would render and enter judgment at such time that the parties presented it to him, reduced to writing and signed by all concerned. Said statement of the court was of no binding effect when made.
After hearing the testimony of appellant and other evidence adduced on appellee’s .motion for judgment, the court should have refused said motion as a matter of law and it erred by entering judgment for appellee on November 23rd.
Accordingly, in the interest of fairness and justice to appellant, I would reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the cause for trial on the merits.