concluding that indictments alleging that the defendant had committed armed robbery and simple robbery were properly admitted in support of the aggravating circumstance when the defendant was ultimately only convicted of simple robbery
How later courts described this case
- concluding that indictments alleging that the defendant had committed armed robbery and simple robbery were properly admitted in support of the aggravating circumstance when the defendant was ultimately only convicted of simple robbery
- holding that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial when there was no indication that the State “intended or anticipated that the witness would mention that the defendant had been in jail”
- detailing evidence presented at the suppression hearing and determining that it was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the Petitioner’s statement had been voluntarily given and not coerced
- accepting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) on the use of felony murder as an aggravating circumstance
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Middlebrooks, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 563 (1992)
755 S.W.2d 757, 764 (Tenn. 1988) (concluding that indictments alleging that the defendant had committed armed robbery and simple robbery were properly admitted in support of the aggravating circumstance when the defendant was ultimately only convicted of simple robbery), overruled on other grounds by State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317
The opinion
OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
In this case appellant was found guilty of murder in the first degree in connection with the shooting of Mr. John Pierce on the afternoon of May 21, 1984. Although the death penalty had been initially requested by the State, upon the return of a guilty verdict by the jury in the Pierce case, the State announced that it would not seek the death penalty. A life sentence was imposed in that case.
The defendant was also tried and convicted at the same time of the murder of Mrs. Novella Webb. This homicide occurred on the same date and a short time after the murder of Mr. Pierce. Appellant was found guilty of the murder of Mrs. Webb and was sentenced to death.
In its previous opinion this Court found that the State had unfairly argued for the death penalty in the Webb case after having waived the death penalty in the Pierce case. The Court held that there should *769 have been a severance of the two offenses, and it reversed the Webb case for a new trial as to both guilt and sentencing.
Both the State and the appellant have filed petitions for rehearing because in its previous opinion the Court did not deal with the appeal of the Pierce case. It was not clear to the Court from the brief of counsel that any appeal was being taken to this Court in the Pierce case.
Appellant cites T.C.A. § 39-2-205 as authority for this Court to assume jurisdiction over both cases. That statute provides:
If the defendant has been convicted of other crimes at the same trial where the death sentence is imposed, the Tennessee Supreme Court shall have authority to review by direct appeal such other crimes if appealed by the defendant with the conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death.
Ordinarily that provision of the statute has been invoked when in connection with the murder trial the accused is convicted of some separate offense, such as the underlying felony in a felony-murder case.
Assuming, however, that it could be applied in the case where a separate life sentence has been imposed for a separate homicide, at the request of appellant we have reviewed the record with respect to the Pierce case. Even though error was found in joining these offenses, we do not believe that the error affected the result in the Pierce case sufficiently to warrant a retrial in that case.
Because the death penalty was given in the Webb case, the Court determined that a retrial of that case was necessary, largely because of the way in which the State attempted to argue in the Webb case that another life sentence would be no punishment to appellant in view of his conviction in the Pierce case.
It was our conclusion in the original opinion that the Webb case should be retried in its entirety, both as to guilt and the sentence, with evidence of the Pierce homicide excluded (except, of course, insofar as it might be made relevant or admissible through the defendant’s proof or in some other manner and except at the retrial his prior conviction of murder in the Pierce case might be used as an aggravating circumstance for purposes of sentencing).
In our opinion any error in the Pierce case in the admission of evidence concerning the Webb homicide did not and could not have affected the guilt trial sufficiently to warrant a retrial of the Pierce charges.
In the original opinion we found no other reversible error, and accordingly we affirm the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed in the Pierce case but remand the Webb case for a complete retrial as provided in the original opinion.
Costs incident to the petition to rehear will be taxed equally to the parties.
HARBISON, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and DROWOTA, JJ., concur.