The opinion
PUDLOWSKI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my previous authored opinion hereinafter stated. I would affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
The relevant facts are as follows: On October 12, 1978, plaintiff-respondent Virginia McConnell was one of approximately 43 passengers of a St. Louis County bus as part of the Fall Color Tour. Ms. McConnell, then aged 79 years and an active lady, suffered severe personal injuries when the bus overturned upon leaving the roadway. She sustained fractured ribs, a collapsed lung, a fracture of the right humerus, a pelvic fracture, and a fracture of the right clavicle. For several months following the accident, she underwent rehabilitation and therapy for these injuries. On November 21, 1979, Ms. McConnell died, for reasons unrelated to the bus accident. Virginia Klamon, her daughter and executrix of her estate, was substituted as nominal plaintiff on April 17, 1980.
Respondent’s claim was one of 40 claims brought against St. Louis County and Robert E. Emerick, the driver of the bus, who has since been discharged under bankruptcy. The claims were brought under RSMo § 537.600. Under the statute the common law governmental tort immunity is effective except for limited exceptions: injuries *659 arising from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles (§ 537.600(1)), and injuries caused by the condition of the public entity’s property if the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury (§ 537.600(2)).
According to § 537.610, the total extent of a public entity’s liability “shall not exceed eight hundred thousand dollars for all claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence and shall not exceed one hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a single accident or occurrence, except [under Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Law].” Appellant St. Louis County’s insurance carrier, The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, made settlements with the 39 other claimants from the bus accident, leaving a balance of $20,300.90 with which to reimburse the last claimant, Virginia McConnell.
At trial, the jury awarded Ms. McConnell $65,000. Appellant St. Louis County contends that the trial judge erred in failing to set aside the judgment of $65,000 and enter a judgment in the amount of $20,300.90 because appellant alleges that St. Louis County could not be liable beyond the $800,-000.00 for all claims arising out of this single accident. I disagree and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the jury award of $65,000. Appellant’s argument as to liability is premature. As I understand the statute, the public entity may be subject in situations similar to this set of facts to money judgments and claims in excess of $800,000 but is responsible for payment of $800,000. Under the sovereign immunity statute, § 537.610(4) clearly contemplates and makes provisions for the possibility that the total amount of the awards and settlements chargeable against the County may exceed $800,000. The statute clearly provides that an apportionment, or pro-rata distribution may be made if the total sum of awards and settlements exceeds such amount. Section 547.-610(4) provides in full:
If the amount awarded to or settled upon multiple claimants exceeds eight hundred thousand dollars, any party may apply to any circuit court to apportion to each claimant his proper share of the total amount limited by subsection 1 of this section. The share apportioned each claimant shall be in the proportion that the ratio of the award or settlement made to him bears to the aggregate awards and settlements for all claims arising out of the accident or occurrence, but the share shall not exceed one hundred thousand dollars, (emphasis added).
Respondent claims that she is entitled to her proportion as set forth in this statute. Respondent contends that a reduction of the judgment from $65,000 to $20,300.90, which is the residue of the $800,000, would deny her the right to a fair proportionate share as provided under this section of the statute. I need not address the issue of the appropriate dollar value to be placed on respondent’s claim under the statute because that issue of collection and the issue of enforcement of this judgment are not presently before us.
Appellant also alleges that the court erred in submitting plaintiff’s verdict directing Instruction No. 4, M.A.I. 31.07 because it was misleading and confusing. I disagree. Taking all the instructions as a whole, I do not find that the jury was mislead or confused in their instructions to adequately compensate the deceased Virginia McConnell for any damages she sustained as to the accident. I would dispose of this point pursuant to Rule 84.16(b). I find no error of law and an extended opinion on this point would have no precedential value.
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court as to the validity of the judgment and as to the appropriateness of the jury instruction.