recognizing district attorney not obligated to bring private criminal complaint simply because facts recited in complaint make out prima facie case, and may exercise sound discretion to refrain from prosecution in good faith belief that prosecution would not serve best interests of state
How later courts described this case
- recognizing district attorney not obligated to bring private criminal complaint simply because facts recited in complaint make out prima facie case, and may exercise sound discretion to refrain from prosecution in good faith belief that prosecution would not serve best interests of state
- explaining that a trial court abuses its discretion when, “without a legitimate basis in the record,” it “substitute[s] its own judgment for that of the district attorney.”
- stating, “the appellate court will review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, in keeping with settled principles of appellate review of discretionary matters.”
- indicating that the district attorney’s disapproval of a private complaint based on its determination that a conviction is unlikely constitutes a policy reason for that disapproval
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOWES, J.,
Dissenting:
¶ 1 In the present case, the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute rested on three rationales, as outlined on page four of the majority’s decision. First, the district attorney concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was minimal, which constituted a legal evaluation of the evidence and is subject to appellate de novo review. Commonwealth v. Benz, 523 Pa. 203 , 565 A.2d 764 (1989) (per three justices with one justice concurring in this result). The district attorney also stated a purported policy decision not to commit its resources to prosecution, but that decision rested solely on its conclusion that the case was one where the likelihood of conviction was slight. Therefore, this policy decision holds weight only if the legal evaluation of the evidence is correct. The third reason stated, which is that Appellant had an adequate civil remedy, is not supportable as a “policy” decision because the victim of a crime can always bring a civil action. The district attorney’s office simply cannot support this reason as an articulated policy because if such a policy drove its decisions as to whether to prosecute, no cases would be prosecuted. 14 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 550 Pa. 580 , 708 A.2d 81 (1998) (evaluation of purported policy reasons for not prosecuting).
¶ 2 Hence, I believe that the foundation of the decision herein rested solely upon a legal evaluation of the evidence and that, in order to properly review that decision, we should examine the evidence used by the district attorney during his assessment. The record does not presently contain that evidence, and we should order its inclusion therein.
. The fact that a single act or acts can give rise to both civil and criminal sanctions reflects the fact that two different interests are being protected. Theoretically speaking, recovery in a civil action addresses the affront against the person and is designed to make the injured party "whole.” Conversely, prosecution in criminal court is designed to address the affront to the sovereign and the citizens of the Commonwealth. This princi-pie is reflected in the following quote from the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government.” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 , 106 S.Ct. 433, 437 , 88 L.Ed.2d 387, 394 (1985). While Appellant’s injury to his person can be redressed by a civil action, a civil action does nothing to redress the affront to the Commonwealth.