Opinion

Wellsville Terminals Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board

  • 534 Pa. 333
  • 632 A.2d 1305
  • 1994 A.M.C. 742
  • 1993 Pa. LEXIS 236
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Nov 16, 1993
Status
Published
Author
Papadakos
On the bench
Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Zappala, Papadakos, Cappy, Montemuro
Cited by
8 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.6%

dismissing the fact that the barge upon which the claimant was injured was tethered to the shore as “an extraordinarily tenuous connection with the land” because it is not uncommon for ships undergoing repairs to be tied to the land

How later courts described this case

  • dismissing the fact that the barge upon which the claimant was injured was tethered to the shore as “an extraordinarily tenuous connection with the land” because it is not uncommon for ships undergoing repairs to be tied to the land
  • claim subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction when ironworker was injured while repairing ship
  • “Davis and Sun Ship have defined and narrowed the scope of Jensen. Nonetheless, maritime employees who are performing traditionally maritime functions and are injured over navigable waters, under Jensen, are constitutionally barred from recovering under any state workmen’s compensation law”
  • “ship repair is clearly a traditional maritime activity”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PAPADAKOS, Justice,

dissenting.

I see no difference between repairs to a ship tethered to land and repairs to a barge tethered to land. In Sun Ship, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 , 100 S.Ct. 2432 , 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980), the United States Supreme Court permitted workers injured while repairing a ship to seek compensation for their injuries through the Longshoremen and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) and our Workmen’s Compensation Act. In the case sub judice, the function performed by the claimant was identical in that he was repairing a barge tethered to the shore. I cannot fathom the gyrations performed by the majority to avoid the obvious.

I find no error of law, or a violation of Board procedure, and I find that the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Our scope of review is satisfied and we *341 must affirm. The learned Commonwealth Court has done its job well and I concur in its conclusion. I, therefore, am compelled to dissent and I would affirm on the basis of the excellent opinion of the Commonwealth Court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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