The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
GREEN, Chief Justice.
The appellants’ motion for rehearing raises no question other than those heretofore decided by the majority of this court, and in my opinion should be overruled. I agree with the statements of facts and the legal conclusions drawn therefrom as contained in Justice Nye’s opinion, and feel that the appeal has been properly decided by this Court.
An experienced and able trial judge has twice heard evidence in this case, each time with different counsel representing the appellants. Conflicting testimony on the issues involved was introduced, much more on the full hearing accorded on appellants’ motion for new trial than on the first hearing. On this appeal, we must presume, in the absence of findings of facts and conclusions of law, that the trial court resolved every disputed fact issue in support of its judgment. Brawley v. Bowen, Tex.Sup.Ct., 387 S.W.2d 383 ; Quinn v. Dupree, 157 Tex. 441 , 303 S.W.2d 769 ; Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507 , 235 S.W.2d 609 , 23 A.L.R.2d 1114 ; North East Texas Motor Lines v. Dickson, 148 Tex. 35 , 219 S.W.2d 795 , 11 A.L.R.2d 1065 . Applying this rule of law to the facts, as reviewed in the majority opinion of this court, I find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court, or in the order overruling the motion for a new trial.
Appellate judges have this advantage over trial attorneys, that they view trials from hind-sight, after the jury verdict, or the judgment of the court. Many records, seen from such angle, display serious mistakes of omission and commission of the attorneys which in all probability have af *915 fected the end result. It is my opinion that we, as an appellate court, should not, because of a mistake or oversight of the attorney representing the losing party, reverse the order of a trial judge who, having heard and observed at first hand the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses, and the facts, has ruled that appellant did receive a fair and legal trial unless we find that there has been a material error committed in the misapplication of the law to the facts as impliedly found by the trial court, or some other error of the trial court probably leading to the entry of an improper judgment. I do not find that such error is shown to have been committed.
In this case, an able and reputable lawyer of fifty-two years experience at the bar agreed to represent appellants in the trial because their first attorney of record asked leave to withdraw for the sole reason as stated in his written motion that appellants had refused to cooperate with him in the defense of the case. The second attorney did appear in the trial of the cause, used his judgment as to how best to defend the case, and lost it. Before criticizing him too severely for not proceeding further with the homestead issue, we must remember that appellee claimed to be an innocent purchaser. The full matter of inadequate representation was presented to the able trial judge on the hearing of the motion for new trial at which appellants were represented by a third set of lawyers, and where much testimony was offered on all issues pertaining to the case. The trial court having overruled appellants’ motion, I feel that his judgment should be affirmed, and the motion for rehearing overruled.
NYE, Justice.
The lawyer who represented the Sando-vals on the original trial testified that he was Executive Attorney and Legal Aid Director for Nueces County. He did not state that he was in the employ of the County, particularly in the capacity as an attorney. The evidence does not show that his employer was not a private organization, set up by private funds, for the purpose of furnishing free legal advice to indigent persons. Our search of the Statutes and laws of the State of Texas fails to reveal any authorization for such an organization as a governmental subdivision of the State of Texas or Nueces County. In view of the trial court’s ruling, we should not presume that the attorney was a public official, furnished to appellants by Nueces County. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not involved in this case.
Further background of the facts undoubtedly considered by the able trial judge reveals from the record that the problem of the Sandovals was brought about originally by their failure to pay the monthly installments due on a home improvement loan contracted by them on their house. Due to an error in describing the property in the mortgage, another lot was designated. Ap-pellee as insurer of the title on the mortgage at the request of the mortgagee paid off the Sandoval debt. Subsequently, appellee purchased the lot from Bosquez which should have been described originally in the mortgage. Although the Sandovals had been delinquent on their obligation many, many months, appellee offered to refinance the property for the amount they had in it, payable in small monthly installments. However, the Sandovals refused the offer, electing to attempt to get the property back free and clear of any mortgage or debt. The trespass to try title action followed.
The appellants, in their motion for rehearing, have failed to show that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant them a new trial.
I agree and adopt the views as expressed by Chief Justice GREEN. Appellants’ motion for rehearing is hereby overruled.