prosecuting attorney with pecuniary interest in related civil matter, impairing obligation , to act impartially, disqualified by public policy from initiating or participating in prosecution; decision to prosecute “must be in accord with tbe fair and impartial administration of justice, untainted by any contaminating influence”
How later courts described this case
- prosecuting attorney with pecuniary interest in related civil matter, impairing obligation , to act impartially, disqualified by public policy from initiating or participating in prosecution; decision to prosecute “must be in accord with tbe fair and impartial administration of justice, untainted by any contaminating influence”
- prosecuting attorney with pecuniary interest in related civil matter, impairing obligation to act impartially, disqualified by public policy from initiating or participating in prosecution; decision to prosecute "must be in accord with the fair and impartial administration of justice, untainted by any contaminating influence"
- asserting “that when a State’s Attorney determines that the public interest requires prosecution, it is his duty to zealously seek to convict those guilty of crime”
- “[I]f a prosecutor has, or would clearly appear to a reasonable person having knowledge of 53 the pertinent facts to have, any pecuniary interest or a significant personal interest in a civil matter which may impair his obligation in a criminal matter to act impartially toward both the State and the accused, then he is, on the basis of this State’s public policy, disqualified from initiating or participating in the prosecution of that criminal cause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gatewood v. State, 388 Md. 526 (2005)
We distinguished Lykins from Sinclair, we recognized that an impermissible pecuniary interest that may have impugned the impartiality of the State’s Attorney’s decision to maintain the prosecution was different from the more basic question Lykins presented — the possibility of a conflict of interest where the State’s Attorney represented the defendant in a civil matter and then later sought tha
The opinion
*261
Smith, J.,
concurring:
I concur in the result insofar as it is based upon a defect in the accusatory process. It is my belief that any expression beyond that should be left to another case on another day.