this Court expressed concerns about the cost-effectiveness of the previous statutory requirement that a convicted parole violator serve his new out-of state (Maryland) sentence prior to serving backtime on his original sentence, even where the Maryland sentence ran concurrently with his original sentence, which resulted in the prisoner serving his Maryland sentence in a Pennsylvania prison prior to serving his backtime
How later courts described this case
- this Court expressed concerns about the cost-effectiveness of the previous statutory requirement that a convicted parole violator serve his new out-of state (Maryland) sentence prior to serving backtime on his original sentence, even where the Maryland sentence ran concurrently with his original sentence, which resulted in the prisoner serving his Maryland sentence in a Pennsylvania prison prior to serving his backtime
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Kerak v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 2016 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 565 (2016)
However, Walker and Santiago are distinguishable from the instant matter.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
I join Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s dissent but write separately to note my understanding of the limits placed upon the Parole Board when it imposes punishment upon a Pennsylvania parolee who violates the terms of his parole.
The Maryland sentencing order is not entitled to full faith and credit to the extent it violates the Pennsylvania Parole Act. On this point, both the majority and dissent agree. 1 The majority, inconsistently, goes on to give full faith and credit to the Maryland sentencing order. It does so by requiring the Board to give Santiago credit on his original Pennsylvania sentence for time spent in a Maryland prison because of a Maryland criminal charge. I agree with Judge Cohn Jubelirer that the Board lacks the authority to award Santiago credit in these circumstances. I also agree with her conclusion that the Board has authority to punish parole violators without interference from Maryland judges.
Nevertheless, the Board cannot extend the maximum length of Santiago’s original Pennsylvania sentence for any reason. I believe requiring Santiago to serve the time remaining on his original sentence together with his backtime is the maximum punishment that can be imposed by the Board for his violation of the terms of his Pennsylvania parole by committing a crime in Maryland. Once Maryland decides to return a parolee to Pennsylvania, the only sentence that parolee can serve is a Pennsylvania sentence.
I construe the Parole Act to allow the Board to punish a parole violator by requiring the parolee to serve the “new sentence” before serving his backtime. 2 However, I would limit the “new sentence” to whatever time is left on the parolee’s original Pennsylvania sentence before the back-time service begins. This is because I do not believe there are any circumstances where a Maryland crime can be punished by time in a Pennsylvania prison.
Judge COHN JUBELIRER joins in this dissent.
. In light of this agreement, the majority should overrule Walker v. Board of Probation and Parole, 729 A.2d 634 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), which held otherwise.
. This is a constructive "new sentence.” It is equal to what the Maryland court ordered Santiago to serve but cannot exceed the number of days remaining on his original sentence.