holding that the executive official enjoyed an absolute privilege from civil damages suit for statements made in a press release regarding personnel decisions
How later courts described this case
- holding that the executive official enjoyed an absolute privilege from civil damages suit for statements made in a press release regarding personnel decisions
- holding absolute immunity shielded city commissioner from lawsuit for defamatory statements made to press regarding former city prosecutor’s dismissal
- holding that press release issued by acting director of Office of Rent Stabilization regarding employee termination was within scope of director’s official duties and absolutely privileged
- noting that issuance of press releases is common agency practice and that it was unduly restrictive to conclude that policy-making executive's scope of duty did not include making public statements of agency policy on matters of wide public interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Melvin T. Smith v. Ferron C. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (1973)
Its age has been questioned as applied to other officials, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434, but in any event it may be said to have existed at common law.
Criticized by Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 33 Or. App. 559 (1978)
The total immunity afforded by Barr v. Matteo, supra, and its kindred has been criticized as being overbroad.
Declined to follow by Kenneth W. Martin v. John P. Malhoyt, John Doe(s) Shirley Ann Stevens v. David H. Stover, John Doe, 830 F.2d 237 (1987)
Instead, we have freshly and closely examined the Barr and Butz opinions; based on that examination, we decline to extend “absolute immunity” to the Park Police misconduct claims sub judice in these cases.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d 342 (2016)
Novoselsky argues that Barr and Blair are inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
My brother Harlan's opinion contains, it seems to me, a lucid and persuasive analysis of the principles that should guide decision in this troublesome area of law. Where I part company is in the application of these principles to the facts of the present case.
I cannot agree that the issuance by the petitioner of this press release was “action in the line of duty.” The statement to the press (set out in note 5 of Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion) did not serve to further any agency function. Instead, it represented a personally motivated effort on the petitioner’s part to disassociate himself from the alleged chicanery with which the agency had been charged.
- By publicizing the action' which he intended, to take when he became permanent Acting Director, and his past ' attitude as a lesser functionary, the petitioner was seeking only to defend his own individual reputation. This was not within, but beyond “the outer perimeter of petitioner’s line of duty.”