holding that the executive official enjoyed an absolute privilege from civil damages suit for statements made in a press release regarding personnel decisions
How later courts described this case
- holding that the executive official enjoyed an absolute privilege from civil damages suit for statements made in a press release regarding personnel decisions
- holding absolute immunity shielded city commissioner from lawsuit for defamatory statements made to press regarding former city prosecutor’s dismissal
- holding that press release issued by acting director of Office of Rent Stabilization regarding employee termination was within scope of director’s official duties and absolutely privileged
- noting that issuance of press releases is common agency practice and that it was unduly restrictive to conclude that policy-making executive's scope of duty did not include making public statements of agency policy on matters of wide public interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Melvin T. Smith v. Ferron C. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (1973)
Its age has been questioned as applied to other officials, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434, but in any event it may be said to have existed at common law.
Criticized by Dizick v. Umpqua Community College, 33 Or. App. 559 (1978)
The total immunity afforded by Barr v. Matteo, supra, and its kindred has been criticized as being overbroad.
Declined to follow by Kenneth W. Martin v. John P. Malhoyt, John Doe(s) Shirley Ann Stevens v. David H. Stover, John Doe, 830 F.2d 237 (1987)
Instead, we have freshly and closely examined the Barr and Butz opinions; based on that examination, we decline to extend “absolute immunity” to the Park Police misconduct claims sub judice in these cases.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d 342 (2016)
Novoselsky argues that Barr and Blair are inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
concurring.
I concur in the reversal of . this judgment but briefly summarize my reasons because they are not altogether the same as those stated in the opinion of Mr.- Justice Harlan.
The petitioner Barr, while acting as Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization, a United States Government Agency, issued a press release in which he gave reasons why he intended to-suspend the respondents Matteo and Madigan, who were also officers of the. Agency. There is some indication in the record that there was an affirmative duty on Mr. Barr to give press releases like this, but however that may be it is clear that his action was forbidden neither by an Act of Congress nor by a,ny governmental rule duly promulgated and in force. It is also clear that *577 the subject matter discussed in the release was germane to the proper functioning of the Rent Stabilization Agency and Mr. Barr’s duties in- relation to it. In fact, at the time the release was issued congressional inquiries were being made into the operations of the Agency and the controversy upon which the threatened suspensions were based, and the press release revealed that Barr had requested an opportunity. to testify before a Congressional Committee with respect to the whole dispute.
The effective functioning of a free-government like ours depends largely on the force of an informed public opinion. This calls for the widest possible understanding of the quality of government service rendered by all elective or appointed public officials or employees. Such an informed understanding depends, of course, on the freedom people have to applaud or to criticize the way public employees do their jobs, from the least to the most important;
Mr. Barr was peculiarly well qualified to inform Congress and the public about the Rent Stabilization Agency. Subjecting him to libel suits for criticizing'the way the Agency or its employees perform their duties would certainly act as a restraint upon him. So far as I am concerned, if federal employees are to be subjected to such restraints in reporting their views about how to run the government better, the restraint will have, to be imposed expressly by Congress and not by the general libel laws of the States or of the District of Columbia. * How far the Congress itself, could go in barring federal officials and employees from discussing public matters consistently with the First Amendment is a question we need, not reach in this case. It is enough for me here that the press release was neither unauthorized nor plainly *578 beyond the scope of Mr. Barr’s' official business, but instead related more or less to general matters committed by law to his control and supervision. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 493, 498-499 .
This case concerns District of Columbia law. In a companion case, Howard v. Lyons, post, p. 593, the Court rejects an attempt to hold a federal employee liable under the libel law of Massachusetts.