Strozewski v. City of Springfield

PRICE, Judge,

concurring in result.

I concur with the result reached by the majority, but disagree with the reasoning. I believe that the petitioner was required to exhaust his administrative remedy provided by the city merit rules.

Citing Kish v. Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 814 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Mo.App.1991), the majority finds no exhaustion requirement in § 536.150 that provides for judicial review of non-eontested hearings. I believe Kish and the majority decision fail to give effect to the plain language of § 536.150(1), which allows for review only of “a decision which is not subject to administrative review.” Two other court of appeals’ decisions have held that this language requires exhaustion.

In State ex rel. Forget v. Franklin County, 809 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Mo.App.1991), the Eastern District noted:

Appellants also claim that RSMo § 536.-150 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides jurisdiction in this case. Even had appellants presented this issue to the trial court below, which they did not, it would not help them. RSMo § 536.150 expressly applies only when the decision of an administrative body is “not subject to administrative review.” As previously stated, RSMo § 64.870 provides an adequate procedure for review. See American Hog Company v. County of Clinton, 495 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Mo.App., K.C.D. 1973).

In St. Peters v. Dept. of Nat. Resources, 797 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Mo.App.1990), the Western District noted, in reference to § 536.150, that:

The statute quite clearly allows for review in cases where a decision has been rendered by an administrative body and where that decision is not subject to administrative review and no other provision for judicial inquiry exists. In other words, the City of St. Peters must exhaust its rights to administrative review in order to invoke this section.

In short, the statutory restriction within § 536.150 as to our jurisdiction to review only “a decision which is not subject to administrative review” in uncontested cases can no more be ignored than the language of § 536.100 requiring that the aggrieved party has “exhausted all administrative remedies” prior to judicial review in contested cases.

The majority attempts to avoid the language of § 536.150(1) by focusing solely on § 536.150(3). That section does indeed provide that “Nothing in this section shall be construed ... to limit the jurisdiction of any court or the scope of any remedy available in the absence of this section.” (Emphasis supplied.) They ignore the underlined language, however. Strozewski has no contract or other claim against the city. Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.1981). His only claim arises from the city’s administrative rules and regulations regarding employment. Strozewski’s only right to pursue these claims arises out of § 536.150, not “in the absence” of it. The majority’s overread-ing of § 536.150(3) results in rendering the § 536.150(1) requirement of “a decision which is not subject to administrative review” a nullity. It is not permissible for us to delete by interpretation express statutory language.

Even if the literal language of § 536.150 did not require exhaustion, judicial policy would. As noted by Neely and Shinn in 20 Mo. Prac., Administrative Practice and Procedure, § 13.04, p. 333:

As a general matter one may not turn to the judiciary for relief in the face of threatened, ongoing or even potential adminis *909 trative action if there are administrative remedies available which have not been exhausted. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is in essence a rule of judicial administration whose object is the preservation of institutional efficiency in the relationships between agencies and courts. It is designed to preclude premature and potentially unnecessary judicial intervention in the administrative process, and the courts will not leave it to the parties to assure that this objective is realized.

While there may be many exceptions to the application of the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, none has been shown here that would override these traditionally respected principles.

I fear that the majority’s holding threatens great harm to our system of judicial review of administrative actions. No longer will complaints that do not rise to the level of a contested case be resolved informally within administrative agencies. Instead, our courts will be subject to a flood of litigation over matters not deemed significant enough by law to require a contested case hearing in an administrative setting. While the rest of the legal community attempts to streamline our legal process into one of more efficient problem-solving through less formal methods, this decision cuts squarely the wrong way.

I believe that StrozewsM’s claim should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.