ruling that "[t]he relevant inquiry is threefold: did the defendant actually act in the heat of passion when he committed the homicide; did the provocation directly lead to the slaying of the person responsible for the provocation; and was there insufficient 'cooling time' thus preventing a reasonable man from using his 'reasoning faculties' and 'capacity to reflect"
How later courts described this case
- ruling that "[t]he relevant inquiry is threefold: did the defendant actually act in the heat of passion when he committed the homicide; did the provocation directly lead to the slaying of the person responsible for the provocation; and was there insufficient 'cooling time' thus preventing a reasonable man from using his 'reasoning faculties' and 'capacity to reflect"
- holding that psychiatric evidence was admissible for the purpose of determining whether the defendant acted in the heat of passion where there was evidence of provocation for the murder of his wife, i.e., that within minutes of the crime, the defendant learned that his wife was leaving him and was pregnant with his stepbrother’s child
- holding that mental health expert testimony is admissible to establish a defendant's state of mind in relation to a heat of passion defense
- indicating that before a defendant's state of mind becomes relevant as to whether there was sufficient provocation, a defendant must first present evidence of provocation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen:
I concur in the grant of a new trial because I am persuaded the trial court erred in precluding the jury from returning a verdict of guilty of voluntary naan- *396 slaughter. In view of all the circumstances disclosed by the record, such a verdict should not have been ruled out as a matter of law. 1 However, I cannot in good conscience agree a new trial should be granted for the reason advanced by the Majority.
In a series of prior cases, this Court consistently ruled psychiatric testimony to the effect that one accused of crime suffered from an emotional or mental compulsion or disturbance which influenced his conduct is not admissible as trial evidence on the issue of guilt, 2 unless the disturbance amounted to insanity within the legal meaning of that term. In my view, this was a wise and sound rule. Regrettably, it is now rejected by a new Majority and the theory of diminished responsibility is recognized and accepted in its stead. Prior decisions are overruled with a doctrinaire logic theoretically appealing, but lacking in practical wisdom.
Knowledge of what governs the mind and man’s behavior has advanced over the centuries, but the science of psychiatry has a long, long way to go before it can be safely relied upon for the purposes the Majority approves and advocates.
The ruling of the Majority in this case opens the door to pitfalls of monumental proportions. To say the least it is illadvised. Prom now on in Pennsylvania every pet theory advanced by a psychiatrist will have probative value in determining criminal responsibility. The psychiatrists should have a field day.
Mr. Justice O’Bbien joins in this opinion.
I also have serious reservations about the correctness of the trial court’s ruling permitting McCusker’s confession, in evidence, but since the Majority do not discuss this issue, I will likewise refrain from doing so.
It is always admissible on the issue of punishment.