holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employee’s complaint alleged, inter alia, employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment, employer tested employee’s blood to monitor lead levels, employer willfully and intentionally withheld employee’s test results which showed employee had developed lead-related diseases, and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer; employee further alleged employer’s concealment of employee’s condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment, and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employee’s injury
How later courts described this case
- holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employee’s complaint alleged, inter alia, employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment, employer tested employee’s blood to monitor lead levels, employer willfully and intentionally withheld employee’s test results which showed employee had developed lead-related diseases, and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer; employee further alleged employer’s concealment of employee’s condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment, and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employee’s injury
- holding a complaint satisfies the requirement of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(b) that fraud must be averred with particularity if it (1) “adequately explain[s] the nature of the claim to the opposing party so as to permit the preparation of a defense” and (2) is “sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge”
- holding employee’s claim of fraudulent misrepresentation was actionable at common law and not barred by exclusivity provision of WCA where employee was not seeking damages for injuries caused by exposure to lead and dust in workplace, which were covered by WCA; instead, employee sought damages for aggravation to lead-related injuries due to employer’s failure to communicate test results evincing employee’s actual condition
- allowing common law recovery for a fraudulent representation made directly to the injured employee that caused aggravation of a pre-existing workplace injury
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Wendler v. Design Decorators, Inc., 2001 Pa. Super. 57 (2001)
As-such, the exception found in Martin is inapplicable.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion but write separately merely to emphasize that the appellees’ cause of action is not barred by Section 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act because the appellees are not seeking redress for the underlying work-related injury but rather the aggravation to that injury as the result of the employer’s fraudulent misrepresentations.
In Poysner v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32 , 522 A.2d 548 (1987), we reiterated that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for all “work-related” injuries. The employee in Poysner attempted to avoid the exclusivity provision by arguing that the employer “intentionally” caused his injury by failing to adhere to governmental safety regulations. However, the. operative factor is not the intentions of the employer but whether the employee’s injury is “work-related”. In Poysner , it was clear that although the employer disregarded safety regulations, the underlying injury was “work-related” and occurred in the course of the employee’s employment.
In this appeal, the appellees are not seeking redress for injuries caused by exposure to lead and dust, for those injuries are covered by the Act. Instead, the appellees are seeking damages for the aggravation to the lead-related injuries due to the employer’s failure to communicate the test results evincing Mr. Martin’s actual condition. Because of this distinction, I agree with the majority and join in affirming the Order of the Superior Court.