declaring that the Child Support Guidelines are based upon the Income Shares Model and that the “Income Shares Model is predicated on the concept that the child should receive the same proportion of parental income that he or she would have received if the parents lived together”
How later courts described this case
- declaring that the Child Support Guidelines are based upon the Income Shares Model and that the “Income Shares Model is predicated on the concept that the child should receive the same proportion of parental income that he or she would have received if the parents lived together”
- It is well settled that “a court has reasonable discretion to deviate from the guidelines if it appears to be necessary and the record supports the deviation.”
- a misapplication of the law is an abuse of discretion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting:
I join the Dissenting Opinion by my colleague, Judge Wieand, in its entirety. I do this on my understanding that Judge Wieand believes that the support guidelines are the proper vehicle for evaluation of an appropriate amount of support, given the facts of this case. I also agree with Judge Wieand that the order entered by the Honorable John E. Blahovec has hot been shown to have been the result of any abuse of discretion.
We had accepted this appeal for en bane consideration on two separate occasions. The single reason for granting en banc review was to resolve this question: Do the new statewide guidelines for support supercede the formula set forth in Melzer v. Witsberger, 505 Pa. 462 , 480 A.2d 991 (1984) for calculating support payments when the parents’ income falls within the guidelines income-levels?
I feel compelled to comment briefly because of my concern regarding the basis for arriving at the answer to the question posed to this intermediate appellate court. While my colleague Judge Beck would appear to reach the same answer as myself to the question concerning the primacy of the guidelines, she does so only after a “discussion of the theoretical and historical roots of the child support guidelines, their goals and their proper application.” Opinion, Beck, J., pages 1194-1195, 1195-1198. By the same token, my colleague, Judge Tamilia, relies upon “a brief historical review of the caselaw and statutory law in Pennsylvania” in reaching the opposite result. Opinion, Tamilia, J., pages 1184-1189. I am not prepared to dispute the accuracy or depth of either analysis. However, I would find the answer *281 to be found much closer to home than the approach of either of my colleagues.
It is enough, for me, that the Supreme Court enjoys the broadest possible power to prescribe and modify general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts. Pa. Const, of 1968, art V, § 10(c); 42 Pa.C.S. § 1722. This power would exist with or without enactment by the legislature of Act 81 of 1989, Act of December 20, 1989, P.L. 654, § 1, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4322(a).
Because of this general rule making power lodged in, and only in, our Supreme Court, I believe it inappropriate for this court to consider either legislative intent or “a century of judicial interpretation of support law” in considering whether or not the rules are applicable. Opinion, Tamilia, J., page 1189. I find no ambiguity in those sections of the support guidelines dealing with their applicability, notably §§ 1910.16-1 and 1910.16-5. I therefore must conclude that the role of the Superior Court on this issue is to maintain and effectuate those guidelines as faithfully as possible, without going outside the rules to find support for their implementation. Compare, Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537 , 486 A.2d 382 (1985).
I read Judge Blahovec’s Findings of Fact, and Order of Court dated March 9, 1990 as being in compliance with the guidelines. I therefore would affirm the support order, and I join Judge WIEAND’s Dissenting Opinion that would do exactly that.