Darlington v. General Electric

BECK, Judge,

concurring:

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court should be affirmed because appellant has failed to establish that General Electric breached a contract when it discharged him. However, I write separately to address certain ramifications of at-will employment which the majority touches but does not emphasize.

In this case appellant sought to remove himself from the status of at-will employment by establishing an enforceable employment contract and its breach. First, appellant contends that the dealings between the parties show that he was promised employment in a “long range program” which created a contract of employment for a “reasonable length of time.” The majority is correct when it states that such expressions as “permanent employment,” “reasonable length of time” and “long range” do not create a contract for a specific tenure (length) of employment. The issue was decided in Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hospital, 320 Pa.Super. 106 , 466 A.2d 1084 (1983), where this Court held that a statement by the employer that its policy was “to provide continual employment to all employees whose work proves satisfactory” did not establish a definite tenure of employment.

The majority’s thorough opinion addresses the general requirements for converting at-will employment into something more. The majority correctly concludes that the “additional consideration rule usually does not offer relief from the at-will presumption to the typical, lower echelon *212 employee ... [n]or ... to the typical white collar professional such as appellant.” Majority op. at 315.

However, the majority’s comprehensive discussion does not address whether employees can establish rights beyond at-will employment by means other than the additional consideration rule. I think they can.

Relying on an employment manual or handbook provided by the employer, an employee can establish contractual rights which prevent his being treated as an at-will employee subject to dismissal for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all.

Provisions in a. handbook or manual can constitute a unilateral offer of employment which the employee accepts by the continuing performance of his or her duties. See Banas v. Matthews International Corp., 348 Pa.Super. 464 , 502 A.2d 637 (1985) (Beck, J., concurring and dissenting). A unilateral contract is a contract wherein one party makes a promissory offer which calls for the other party to accept by rendering a performance. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 and Comment (a) thereunder (1981). In the employment context, the communication to employees of certain rights, policies and procedures may constitute an offer of an employment contract with those terms. The employee signifies acceptance of the terms and conditions by continuing to perform the duties of his or her job; no additional or special consideration is required. See Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group, Colo.App., 684 P.2d 264 (1984); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579 , 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, Minn., 333 N.W.26d 622 (1983); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677 , 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Southwest Gas Co. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594 , 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284 , 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474 , 483 P.2d 1314 (1971); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458 , 443 N.E.2d 441 , 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla.Ct.App. *213 1976); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219 , 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).

In most of the cases applying the unilateral contract theory, the employee has used the terms of an employee manual as the source of the promises on which he bases his contractual claim. See Banas v. Matthews International Corp., (Beck, J., concurring and dissenting). Appellant unsuccessfully makes a similar claim in the case sub judice. Appellant contends that certain provisions in General Electric’s Handbook for Exempt Employees entitled “Problem Solving” constituted contractual obligations which were breached by General Electric. The majority does not actually decide whether the handbook had contractual significance, but concludes that even if it did, it did not create a contract whereby appellant could be dismissed only for cause.

I would add to the majority’s conclusion my conviction that the handbook has contractual significance although appellant has no enforceable right under it for continued employment. I would so hold based on the well-reasoned decisions of our sister states, especially the unanimous holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Woolley .