stating that “the [WCAB] may only grant a rehearing where there is ‘after[-]discovered, noncumulative evidence [that] could not have been, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, produced at the original hearing’”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the [WCAB] may only grant a rehearing where there is ‘after[-]discovered, noncumulative evidence [that] could not have been, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, produced at the original hearing’”
- although holding that Board had broad discretion in granting a petition for a rehearing, Supreme Court recognized that the petition must be filed within eighteen months after the Board’s original decision under Section 426
- “[Claimant attempted to appeal the Board’s decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County on September 26, 1980. The appeal was quashed, apparently because the Common Pleas Court ruled, correctly so, that it did not have jurisdiction to take an appeal from the [Board]. See Section 763 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 763.”
- concerning the Board's power to grant a rehearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mitchell v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 129 Pa. Commw. 261 (1989)
However, the facts in Cudo are also distinguishable from the situation in this case.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Recognizing that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is intended to be remedial in nature, I join the position espoused in the Opinion of the Court. All too often claimants for workmen’s compensation benefits are not represented by counsel before the referee who hears evidence and makes findings of fact. The strict view of the dissent, which would permit a claimant only one opportunity to meet his or her substantial burden irrespective of the dictates of justice, is not appropriate in this area of jurisprudence.