stating that the "inquiry in this case is whether ... providing children with the opportunity to attend summer camp below cost is a charitable and benevolent purpose"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the "inquiry in this case is whether ... providing children with the opportunity to attend summer camp below cost is a charitable and benevolent purpose"
- noting that the organization provided religious instruction through a “Faith Development” class but also “conducted] ... traditional summer camp activities”
- Episcopal Camp Foundation qualified for exemption despite stated purpose “to maintain camps ... which will carry on moral, cultural, religious and recreational training and education_”
- affirming tax exemption for a nonprofit summer camp that leased its property in the off-season
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GLASSMAN, Justice,
with whom RUDMAN and DANA, Justices, join,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The law is well established that taxation is the rule and tax exemption is the exception. Silverman v. Town of Alton, 451 A.2d 103, 105 (Me. 1982). Accordingly, “[w]e begin with the general principle, well established in Maine law, that an exemption from taxation, while entitled to reasonable interpretation in accordance with its purpose, is not to be extended by application to situations not clearly coming within the scope of the exemption provisions.” Harold MacQuinn, Inc. v. Halperin, 415 A.2d 818, 820 (Me.1980) (citations omitted). In the instant case, although the Foundation provides a significant number of scholarships to children to attend the Camp which it operates on a non-profit basis, these factors alone are insufficient to constitute a charitable purpose. See, e.g., Camping & Educ. Found, v. State, 282 Minn. 245 , 164 N.W.2d 369, 374 (1969) (holding that profit motive cannot be sole criterion for determining tax exempt status).
There is no overriding principle immediately apparent from our prior cases. 1 Implicit, however, in each case that presents the issue whether an organization has been conducted exclusively for charitable purposes is an evaluation of its activities to determine if they alleviate a public need “which otherwise the government would have to provide.” YMCA of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 323 Pa. 401 , 187 A. 204, 210 (1936). See, e.g., Town of Poland v. Poland, Spring Health Inst., Inc., 649 A.2d 1098 (Me.1994) (providing primary and preventative health care a charitable purpose); Maine AFL-CIO Housing Dev. Corp. v. Town of Madawaska, 523 A.2d 581 (Me.1987) (operating housing project for low-income elderly or handicapped persons a charitable purpose); Camp Emoh Assoc, v. Town of Lyman, 132 Me. 67 , 166 A. 59 (1933) (operating tuition-free summer camp for indigent Jewish children a charitable purpose). See also City of Bangor *112 v. Rising Virtue Lodge, 73 Me. 428 (1882) (Masonic Lodge not statutorily exempted on basis that funds collected from members were distributed among poor and needy members and their wives and children).
The activities offered at the Camp, including those directed to the goals of “good citizenship, social living and civic responsibility and to cooperate in community welfare enterprises,” do not materially differ from the activities typically offered by children’s summer camps that operate for profit. Nor can it be said that the activities are a public benefit akin to providing services to indigent or low-income persons or persons requiring health care. In my opinion, the purpose of the Foundation in establishing Camp Bish-opswood was to provide to any child, regardless of financial need, a summer camp experience. As laudable as this goal may be, it is not “unmistakably within the spirit and intent” of section 651. Holbrook Island Sanctuary v. Town of Brooksville, 161 Me. 476, 483 , 214 A.2d 660, 664 (1965). On this record, the Foundation should not be exempt from the universal obligation to contribute proportionately toward the cost to the government in meeting public needs. There being no challenge to the amount of the assessed tax, I would vacate the judgment and remand this case for the entry of a judgment in favor of the Town of Hope.
. Missionary societies have long been deemed to possess the required attributes of benevolent and charitable institutions for tax exemption purposes. Green Acre Baha'i Inst. v. Town of Eliot, 150 Me. 350 , 110 A.2d 581 (1954); Universalist Church v. City of Saco, 136 Me. 202 , 7 A.2d 428 (1939); Maine Baptist Missionary Convention v. City of Portland, 65 Me. 92 (1876).