explaining that an individual who drives a getaway car and waits outside a convenience store while the perpetrator robs the store, is guilty as a principal in the second degree of robbery and the person who actually robbed the store is guilty as a principal in the first degree of robbery
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an individual who drives a getaway car and waits outside a convenience store while the perpetrator robs the store, is guilty as a principal in the second degree of robbery and the person who actually robbed the store is guilty as a principal in the first degree of robbery
- affirming death sentence and finding that sentencing authority was not required to find statutory mitigating circumstances despite defendant's age at time of crime (19), extensive proof of defendant's history of substance abuse, mental illness and other cognitive impairment, and defendant's apology and promise that she would never do anything again which would result in her imprisonment
- holding that the taking of property still constituted a robbery even though the original attack may not have been committed for the purpose of taking the victim’s property
- holding that taking and asportation of property constitutes robbery even where intent to steal is not formed until after application of force resulting in death
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576 (2000)
Furthermore, the facts in Stebbing easily are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
The opinion
DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I adhere to my view expressed in my dissenting opinion in Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 485-94, 501-02 , 468 A.2d 1, *391 26-31, 34-35 (1983) (Davidson, J., dissenting) (Tichnell III) that the legislative history and legislative purpose of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 414(e)(4) require the term “similar cases” to be construed to include not only those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty whether it was imposed or not, but also those other death eligible murder cases in which the prosecutor could have but did not seek the death penalty. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion upholding the imposition of the death penalty. I would vacate the death sentence and remand for the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment.