applying the constitutional vagueness standard to a state statute prohibiting the display of visual depiction of material “harmful to minors” which includes any “representation” of “excessive violence” and holding that any deficiency “is not cured by incorporating violence in the definition of obscenity as to minors”
How later courts described this case
- applying the constitutional vagueness standard to a state statute prohibiting the display of visual depiction of material “harmful to minors” which includes any “representation” of “excessive violence” and holding that any deficiency “is not cured by incorporating violence in the definition of obscenity as to minors”
- holding that the courts should adopt the plausible construction that avoids undermining the statute’s constitutionality
- interpreting the “harmful to minors” standard incorporated into the AEA to specifically consider value for “a reasonable 17-year-old minor” (emphasis added)
- courts have a “duty to adopt a construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REID, Chief Justice.
I concur, and write separately to emphasize that the court in this case does not proscribe expression by arbitrary definition as the majority did in State v. Marshall, 859 *539 S.W.2d 289, 295 (Tenn.1993). Instead, the Court decides “whether the State, in serving the compelling interest of protecting minors, has drawn its statute narrowly enough to avoid unnecessarily interfering with free speech rights.” The state’s interest in protecting minors from harm is not disputed, nor is the premise that the material defined by the statute causes harm to minors. The essential issue is the balancing of the plaintiffs’ rights of expression against the state’s interest in protecting minors from harm. The statute as construed by the Court, is “the least intrusive means of regulation,” and, therefore, does not violate Article I, Section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. This decision is consistent with the position stated in dissent in State v. Marshall:
[Ejxpression may be limited only to protect a compelling state interest, that the means used to protect competing interests must bear a substantial relation to an identified harm, and the least intrusive means must be utilized to accomplish the state interest.
State v. Marshall, 859 S.W.2d 289, 295 (Tenn.1993) (Reid, C.J. concurring and dissenting.)