holding that, in reviewing complaint of charge error, court of appeals must first decide whether jury instruction is erroneous, and, if so, court then determines whether instruction harmed defendant by applying either “some harm” standard if complaint was preserved for appeal, or “egregious harm” standard if complaint was not preserved for appeal
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in reviewing complaint of charge error, court of appeals must first decide whether jury instruction is erroneous, and, if so, court then determines whether instruction harmed defendant by applying either “some harm” standard if complaint was preserved for appeal, or “egregious harm” standard if complaint was not preserved for appeal
- holding that, when conducting a harm analysis with respect to purported charge error, reviewing courts should consider the charge itself; the state of the evidence, including contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; arguments of counsel; and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole
- holding that “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole”
- holding that the omission of an element from the authorization paragraph in a non-capital case is error subject to a harm analysis in which the appellate court reviews the entire jury charge and the state of the evidence in the case to decide whether the error requires reversal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez v. State, 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 186 (1988)
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787, 788
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Rodriguez v. State
686 S.W.2d at 171 (op. on reh’g), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787
Distinguished
Distinguished by Steven Jones v. State (2006)
argument are not consistent with our reading of Almanza or, in the alternative, are distinguishable.
Distinguished by Douglas W. Frieling v. State (2002)
No error being shown, Almanza is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Ieppert v. State, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 100 (1995)
Accordingly, it is clear that the hybrid forfeiture/harmless error provisions of article 36.19, as construed by Almanza, are also inapplicable to appellant’s contentions in the instant causes.
Distinguished by Green v. State, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 96 (1995)
Therefore, appellant waived any error, and the Almanza standard is inapplicable.
The opinion
MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
Although there is merit in the dissenting opinion of Judge Clinton, I concur with the decision of the majority to dismiss the State’s petition in this case as improvidently granted because the issue of the relationship between fundamental error in the court’s charge and error in the court’s charge as contemplated by Article 36.19, V.A.C.C.P., has not been thoroughly briefed or argued by. either the State or the defense. Historically the advocacy system has served the judiciary well in charting the course of criminal jurisprudence in this state. If we are going to redefine fundamental error vis-a-vis the court’s charge to the jury, as perhaps we should, then let us do so when the issue is properly joined, either on motion for rehearing in this case or in a future case before the court. Because the dissent would raise and address the issue sua sponte in this case, I concur in dismissing the State’s petition.