holding that, in reviewing complaint of charge error, court of appeals must first decide whether jury instruction is erroneous, and, if so, court then determines whether instruction harmed defendant by applying either “some harm” standard if complaint was preserved for appeal, or “egregious harm” standard if complaint was not preserved for appeal
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in reviewing complaint of charge error, court of appeals must first decide whether jury instruction is erroneous, and, if so, court then determines whether instruction harmed defendant by applying either “some harm” standard if complaint was preserved for appeal, or “egregious harm” standard if complaint was not preserved for appeal
- holding that, when conducting a harm analysis with respect to purported charge error, reviewing courts should consider the charge itself; the state of the evidence, including contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; arguments of counsel; and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole
- holding that “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole”
- holding that the omission of an element from the authorization paragraph in a non-capital case is error subject to a harm analysis in which the appellate court reviews the entire jury charge and the state of the evidence in the case to decide whether the error requires reversal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez v. State, 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 186 (1988)
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787, 788
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Rodriguez v. State
686 S.W.2d at 171 (op. on reh’g), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787
Distinguished
Distinguished by Steven Jones v. State (2006)
argument are not consistent with our reading of Almanza or, in the alternative, are distinguishable.
Distinguished by Douglas W. Frieling v. State (2002)
No error being shown, Almanza is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Ieppert v. State, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 100 (1995)
Accordingly, it is clear that the hybrid forfeiture/harmless error provisions of article 36.19, as construed by Almanza, are also inapplicable to appellant’s contentions in the instant causes.
Distinguished by Green v. State, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 96 (1995)
Therefore, appellant waived any error, and the Almanza standard is inapplicable.
The opinion
OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TEAGUE, Judge.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated the following in Almanza v. State, 645 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.App. — Ft. Worth 1983):
Although many recent opinions have offhandedly dismissed the changing of ‘and’ in the indictment to ‘or’ in the court’s charge, such approach is dangerous and usually fatal in matters where aggravation or jurisdiction is involved. In the instant cause of aggravated rape the indictment joined the allegation of threats of death to the standard form allegation of rape by the word and. In the court’s charge, [however], the aggravation feature was disjoined from rape by the word or. Such constitutes fundamental error. Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
The cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings under this indictment.
The State has filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court, asking us to make the determination whether the above decision of the Court of Appeals is correct. We have concluded, after the respective parties favored this Court with well written supplemental briefs, as well as making outstanding oral arguments, that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in all things correct.
The State’s petition for discretionary review was improvidently granted. It is therefore-ordered dismissed.