upholding denial of suppression where defendant claimed that he was confused when he gave his statement and that his confession had internal conflicts, reasoning that such matters were credibility issues for the jury, to be explored through cross examination
How later courts described this case
- upholding denial of suppression where defendant claimed that he was confused when he gave his statement and that his confession had internal conflicts, reasoning that such matters were credibility issues for the jury, to be explored through cross examination
- holding that juvenile adjudications qualify as "convictions” for purposes of the significant- history aggravator
- stating that the law presumes that juries follow the trial court’s instructions as to the applicable law
- stating that the presumption in our law is that the jury follows a trial court’s instructions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I continue to possess the view that juvenile adjudications should not be used for establishing aggravating circumstances to justify the death sentence. I therefore dissent from the majority opinion that a history of juvenile adjudications may be used as an aggravating circumstance under the Death *571 Penalty Statute. I concur, however, in the Court’s affirmance of a finding of murder in the first degree.
Juvenile adjudications do not operate within the same constitutional bounds as criminal proceedings at the adult level. There is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339 , 265 A.2d 350 (1970), aff'd sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 , 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 283 Pa.Super. 455 , 424 A.2d 897 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 , 102 S.Ct. 292 , 70 L.Ed.2d 141 (1981). A finding of delinquency does not connote the punitive concern that is connected with a conviction of a criminal offense. In Interest of Spause, 381 Pa.Super. 166, 172 , 553 A.2d 87, 90 , (“The purpose of juvenile proceedings is to seek treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile; it is not to punish”) appeal denied, 523 Pa. 643 , 563 A.2d 1167 , 1168 (1989); In Interest of Leonardo, 291 Pa.Super. 644, 648 , 436 A.2d 685, 687 (1981) (“Clearly juvenile proceedings are different in character and purpose from adult proceeding---- The purpose of juvenile proceeding is to seek treatment, reformation and rehabilitation, and not to punish.”)
The concern in delinquency proceedings remains the well-being of the minor. When “the court finds that the child is not in need of treatment, supervision or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceeding and discharge the child from any detention or other restriction theretofore ordered.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 6341(b). See, Interest of Dreslinski, 254 Pa.Super. 539 , 386 A.2d 81 (1978) (despite finding of delinquency trial court found no need for treatment; dismissed action). 1
The Juvenile Act specifically purports to “remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(4) (“Short title and pur *572 poses of Chapter”). The focus of the Juvenile Act is to rehabilitate and treat juvenile offenders. If the juvenile court finds that a juvenile offender belongs in adult criminal proceedings, then the juvenile court has the discretion to transfer that case to criminal court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355 (“Transfer to criminal proceedings”). If the child is fourteen years of age or older, not amenable to treatment under the juvenile system, and the charge could carry imprisonment of three years or more, inter alia, then the child may be transferred to criminal court and tried as an adult. Id. Convictions under these circumstances may be admissible as part of a “significant history of felony convictions” under the aggravating circumstances subsection of the Death Penalty Statute. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). However, in this case, the appellant’s juvenile adjudications of delinquency should not have been treated as convictions constituting a “significant history of felony convictions....” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9).
Section 6354 of the Juvenile Act says in no uncertain terms that an adjudication is not a conviction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354. 2 Subsection (b) allows the disposition to be used against a defendant after reaching majority when it is for the purposes of a presentence investigation or report; it does not change the classification of the disposition to a conviction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354(b).
The death penalty statute provides much less discretion to the sentencing body than the sentencing guidelines for non- *573 capital offenses. In the sentencing guidelines for non-capital offenses the Pennsylvania Legislature included a catchall provision in its list of aggravating circumstances for the court to consider when imposing a sentence upon a convicted defendant. 204 Pa.Code § 303.3(b)(6). 3 Conversely, the Death Penalty Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711, enumerates sixteen specific aggravating circumstances to be weighed by the jury when deliberating the sentence of death. 4 The phase “shall be *574 limited” in subsection (d) reflects legislative intent to limit aggravating circumstance to the sixteen explicitly enumerated circumstances and to forbid the jury from considering any additional aggravating circumstances. Id. Subsection (e) of the Death Penalty Statute (governing the use of mitigating circumstances) uses the language “shall include the following” and allows “[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e). 5 Because subsection (e) *575 includes a catchall provision and subsection (d) does not, it is clear that the Legislature intended to limit strictly the aggravating circumstances.
Additionally, The Death Penalty Statute provides that the jury and not the court must determine the sentence; first degree murder is the only crime for which the General Assembly has allowed the jury to impose a sentence. Once a jury convicts a defendant of first degree murder, “the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(1). “Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed [but] ... [e]vidence of aggravated circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) (emphasis added). This language is contrary to the Sentencing Code for non-capital offenses that allows the court to consider “any other factors which in the court’s opinion warrant a sentence in the aggravating range”, 204 Pa.Code § 303.3(b)(6). See, supra, note 3.
Having examined the texts of the appropriate statutes, we must now examine our caselaw to seek any authority for the use of juvenile adjudications to establish a “significant history of felony convictions.” The majority relies on the following cases to support its proposition that adjudications of delinquency may be aggravating circumstances to be weighed by the jury when deliberating a sentence of death: Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224 , 144 A.2d 367 (1958); Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33 , 16 A.2d 50 (1940); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349 , 35 A.2d 312 (1944); Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Maroney, 179 Pa.Super. 305 , 116 A.2d 755 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Yeschen *576 ko v. Kerman, 179 Pa.Super. 145 , 115 A.2d 386 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Czarnecki v. Stitzel, 179 Pa.Super. 80 , 115 A.2d 805 (1955); Commonwealth v. Woodward, 368 Pa.Super. 363 , 534 A.2d 478 (1987) appeal denied, 520 Pa. 575 , 549 A.2d 135 (1988); Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511 , 533 A.2d 134 (1987); Commonwealth v. Morio, 302 Pa.Super. 407 , 448 A.2d 1106 (1982); Commonwealth v. Allen, 287 Pa.Super. 88 , 429 A.2d 1113 (1981). The cases cited do not support that conclusion.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, the defendant was found guilty of burglary, larceny, receiving stolen goods, and prison breach. Id. 393 Pa. at 226 , 144 A.2d at 369 . There was no charge of murder. Therefore, less restrictive sentencing guidelines applied, and the judge, not the jury, imposed the sentence. Id. In Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 33 , 16 A.2d 50 (1940), the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder and a panel of judges sentenced him to death. Id. 340 Pa. at 36-37 , 16 A.2d at 53 . The only common fact between the case at bar and Petrillo is that there was a sentence of death. However, it was imposed under the 1939 Crimes Code, the jury did not determine the sentence, and there was no mention of any juvenile proceedings. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349 , 35 A.2d 312 (1944), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a death penalty sentence because the judges had heard ex parte information about the defendant relevant to the defendant’s sentencing. The Court recognized the defendant’s absolute right to be present for the presentation of any evidence at the sentencing stage of the proceeding. Id. 348 Pa. at 353 , 35 A.2d at 314-15 . The Supreme Court did not refer to juvenile adjudications.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Maroney, 179 Pa.Super. 305 , 116 A.2d 755 (1955), the defendant himself testified about his juvenile adjudication relating to his sentencing for non-capital offenses. Furthermore, the Superior Court never mentioned the Petrillo case nor did it review the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Yeschenko v. Keenan, 179 Pa.Super. 145 , 115 A.2d 386 (1955), the Superior Court affirmed the *577 dismissal of the defendant’s writs of error coram vobis and habeas corpus. The court held that prior criminal records were properly considered by the judge in sentencing the defendant for robbery, aggravated assault and battery, and pointing firearms. The Keenan case is inapplicable, however, because the offenses in Keenan were not punishable by death; thus juvenile records, which were not offered in that case, would have been admissible. Id.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Czarnecki v. Stitzel, 179 Pa.Super. 80 , 115 A.2d 805 (1955), the Superior Court considered the juvenile’s admission of committing forty-one burglaries as a juvenile when reviewing a sentence of five to twenty years for burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. The Superior Court upheld the Court of Common Pleas’ dismissal of the defendant’s writ of habeas corpus. Id. 179 Pa.Super. at 83, 115 A.2d at 806. Again, this was a non-capital case.
Commonwealth v. Woodward, 368 Pa.Super. 363 , 534 A.2d 478 (1987), addressed the use of juvenile adjudications as aggravating circumstances to be considered where the trial judge sentenced the defendant for forgery and theft by deception. The Superior Court relied upon Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511 , 533 A.2d 134 (1981), for its holding. Woodward, 368 Pa.Super. at 366-67 , 534 A.2d at 480 . In Krum , the Superior Court upheld the trial court’s consideration of juvenile adjudications when imposing a sentence of four to eight years for burglary. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. at 521 , 533 A.2d at 139 .
In Commonwealth v. Morio, 302 Pa.Super. 407 , 448 A.2d 1106 (1982), the Superior Court upheld the use of juvenile records in sentencing defendant to the maximum allowable sentence. In this ease, the crimes were civil assault, escape, and criminal conspiracy, which are not covered by the sentencing provisions at issue in this case. See id. Additionally, Commonwealth v. Allen, 287 Pa.Super. 88 , 429 A.2d 1113 (1981), also involves a non-capital case and the use of juvenile adjudication as factors for sentencing.
In summary, there is nothing in our caselaw or in the texts of the Juvenile Act or the Death Penalty Statute to support *578 the majority’s opinion that juvenile adjudications may be considered as aggravating circumstances in the determination of the death sentence under our present statute.
Nor can we consider this harmless error. It is not possible to determine how much weight the jury placed on the juvenile adjudications when finding that there was “a significant history of felony convictions.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). However, because the jury considered the juvenile adjudications improperly, then we must reverse the finding of that specific aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, pursuant to the review portion of the Death Penalty Statute, 6 we should remand this case for a redetermination of the appropriate sentence for the defendant.
ZAPPALA and CAPPY, JJ., join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.
. In adult criminal proceedings, the court places greater emphasis on society’s needs rather than on the convicted criminal's needs. In criminal cases, “the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) (“Sentencing Generally; general standards”) (emphasis added).
. The statute provides:
§ 6354. Effect of adjudication
(a) General rule. — An order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this chapter is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.
(b) Effect in subsequent judicial matters. — The disposition of a child under this chapter may not be used against him in any proceeding in court other than at a subsequent juvenile hearing whether before or after reaching majority, except:
(1) in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence investigation and report; or
(2) if relevant, where he has put his reputation or character in issue in a civil matter.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6354 (emphasis added).
. Section 303.3(b)(6) provides:
(6) "any other factors which in the court’s opinion, warrant a sentence in the aggravating range.”
. The statute provides that:
(d) Aggravating circumstances — Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(1) The victim was a fireman, peace officer or public servant concerned in official detention, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121 (relating to escape), who was killed in the performance of his duties.
(2) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the victim.
(3) The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.
(4) The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the hijacking of an aircraft.
(5) The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.
(6) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.
(7) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.
(8) The offense was committed by means of torture.
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(10) The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.
(11) The defendant has been convicted of another murder, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.
(12) The defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter), committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.
(13) The defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice in the killing, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c) (relating to liability for *574 conduct of another; complicity), while in the perpetration of a felony under the provisions of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and punishable under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 (relating to drug trafficking sentencing and penalties).
(14) At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to promote the defendant’s activities in selling, manufacturing, distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances.
(15) At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental informant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police agency with information concerning criminal activity and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental informant or in providing information concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or police agency.
(16) The victim was a child under 12 years of age.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d) (emphasis added).
. (e) Mitigating circumstances. — Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.
(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(4) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S. *575 § 309 (relating to duress), or acted under the substantial domination of another person.
(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal acts.
(7) The defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstance of his offense.
Id. (emphasis added).
. The statute provides:
(h) Review of death sentence.—
(1) A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules.
(2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sentence of death and remand for further proceedings as provided in paragraph (4).
(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
(i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor;
(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (e); or
(iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant.
(4) If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated because none of the aggravating circumstances are supported by sufficient evidence or because the sentence of death is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, then it shall remand for the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence. If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated for any other reason, it shall remand for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to subsections (a) through (g).
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h).
Because the introduction of the defendant’s juvenile adjudications was prejudicial, under paragraph 3(i), we should remand the case for resentencing under paragraph (4).