stating that we neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute
How later courts described this case
- stating that we neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute
- stating that “[we] neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain language of the statute . . .”
- stating that “nor [do we] construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.”
- “Furthermore, ‘the party attacking [a statutory classification] must show by clear and convincing evidence that it does not rest upon any rational basis but is essentially arbitrary.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
MURPHY, J.,
which BELL, C.J., and GREENE, J., join.
While I recognize that Petitioner has not argued that the legislation at issue is a “special law” prohibited by Section 33 of Article III of the Maryland Constitution, I would decide this issue as “desirable to guide the trial court [as well as] to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.” Maryland Rule 8-131(a).
In State v. Burning Tree Club, 315 Md. 254 , 554 A.2d 366 (1989), this Court stated:
In Cities Service Co. v. Governor, 290 Md. 553, 567 , 431 A.2d 663 (1981), this Court examined decisions applying § 33, concluding that “no mechanical rules for deciding cases” exist. Nonetheless, the Court enumerated several factors to be considered in deciding whether a statute is a “special law.” The Court reiterated the importance of these factors in State v. Good Samantan Hospital, 299 Md. 310 , 473 A.2d 892 (1984). The factors include: whether “the underlying purpose of the legislation is to benefit or burden a particular class member or members”; whether particular *351 people or entities are identified in the statute; and what “the substance and ‘practical effect’ ” of a statute is and not simply its form. State v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra, 299 Md. at 330 , 473 A.2d at 902 ; Cities Service Co. v. Governor, supra, 290 Md. at 569 , 431 A.2d at 672-673 . Our past decisions have also considered whether particular entities or individuals sought and obtained special advantages under the legislation or if other similar entities or individuals were discriminated against by the legislation. Cities Service Co., supra, 290 Md. at 570 , 431 A.2d at 673 . In deciding whether a law violates § 33 in applying to only certain members of a class, we have looked to whether the statute’s distinctions are arbitrary or unreasonable. Ibid. Moreover, this Court has held that some enactments were not special laws even though they applied to only a single entity. Such laws are permissible where unique circumstances render the entity a class unto itself, Cities Service Co., supra, 290 Md. at 568 , 431 A.2d at 672 , or where the enactment, although it affects only one entity currently, would apply to other similar entities in the future, Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 305-306 , 380 A.2d 12 (1977); Potomac Sand & Gravel v. Governor, 266 Md. 358, 379 , 293 A.2d 241 (1972).
Id. at 273-74, 554 A.2d at 376 .
In the case at bar, the General Assembly has enacted a statute that provides for injunctive relief against Petitioner, and prohibits such relief against every similar entity in Allegany County. It is clear that the enactment at issue (1) has the practical effect of imposing a burden on no entity other than Petitioner, and (2) will not apply to other similar entities in the future. Under these circumstances, the injunction should be dissolved on the ground that it is based upon an unconstitutional “special” law.
Moreover, while the General Assembly certainly has the right to enact statutes that allow (or require) the trial judge to impose an enhanced penalty for a second (or subsequent) conviction of driving while impaired by alcohol, and that provide for the imposition of “alcohol restrictions” on motor *352 ists who have been convicted of that offense, it would not be rational to conclude that the General Assembly also has the right to enact a statute under which the only persons who can henceforth be convicted of driving while impaired by alcohol are persons who (1) committed that offense in Allegany County, and (2) had previously been convicted of that offense prior to October 1, 2009. I would therefore hold that the enactment also fails the “rational basis” test.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge GREENE have authorized me to state that they join this dissent.