holding that the three jury questions required under Carpenter for partial takings cases “should be reduced to two questions: first, the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land, and second, damages to the remainder, accompanied by an instruction that such damages should be determined by considering the difference between the remainder’s pre-and post-taking value”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the three jury questions required under Carpenter for partial takings cases “should be reduced to two questions: first, the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land, and second, damages to the remainder, accompanied by an instruction that such damages should be determined by considering the difference between the remainder’s pre-and post-taking value”
- recognizing that “publicly targeting a property for condemnation, resulting in economic damage to the owner, generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property.”
- stating that an inverse condemnation or ‘taking’ action is available to compensate a property owner for a loss resulting when his property has been taken or damaged for public use without compensation or a condemnation proceeding
- explaining that this form of submission is appropriate in cases where the part taken is difficult to value as severed land and there is no evidence that the condemnation increased the remainder's value
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENT ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Dec. 2, 1992.
DOGGETT, Justice.
In its further writing on rehearing, the majority has failed to address the most far-reaching of the misinterpretations reflected in its previous writing. One of these is the majority’s turn away from broad form submission which has unfortunately become part of a broad scale abandonment of this principle. See H.E.B. Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting); State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting); Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 268 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
MAUZY, J., joins in this dissent on motion for rehearing.