holding that the three jury questions required under Carpenter for partial takings cases “should be reduced to two questions: first, the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land, and second, damages to the remainder, accompanied by an instruction that such damages should be determined by considering the difference between the remainder’s pre-and post-taking value”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the three jury questions required under Carpenter for partial takings cases “should be reduced to two questions: first, the market value of the part taken, considered as severed land, and second, damages to the remainder, accompanied by an instruction that such damages should be determined by considering the difference between the remainder’s pre-and post-taking value”
- recognizing that “publicly targeting a property for condemnation, resulting in economic damage to the owner, generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property.”
- stating that an inverse condemnation or ‘taking’ action is available to compensate a property owner for a loss resulting when his property has been taken or damaged for public use without compensation or a condemnation proceeding
- explaining that this form of submission is appropriate in cases where the part taken is difficult to value as severed land and there is no evidence that the condemnation increased the remainder's value
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting.
July 1, 1992
I agree with Justice Doggett that a bad faith standard in inverse condemnation claims based on delay will adequately balance the interests of property owners with the concerns of the public. I also am concerned that the majority has abandoned its recent precedent in Caller-Times in adopting a new, overly restrictive standard for remanding in the interest of justice. The rejection of broad-form jury submissions included in that test, at 455 n. 6, clearly violates the letter of Tex.R.Civ.P. 277 and this court’s recent writing in Texas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.1990). For these reasons, I dissent.
Rehearing Overruled, Dec. 2, 1992.