recognizing the right “not to incriminate [oneself], as by a plea of guilt (Fifth Amendment) and to have a jury trial should he plead not guilty (Sixth Amendment)” (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968))
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the right “not to incriminate [oneself], as by a plea of guilt (Fifth Amendment) and to have a jury trial should he plead not guilty (Sixth Amendment)” (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968))
- 6 Justices + 1 judge temporarily assigned
- no Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment violation because defendant who pled guilty could receive a lesser sentence than one who did not
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by State v. Morales, 224 N.J. Super. 72 (1987)
[9] State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379 (1977) held that the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) was limited to its facts the death penalty.
The opinion
Sullivan, J.
(dissenting). I find myself unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion in the majority opinion; Plainly stated, the statutory sentencing scheme before us provides that if a defendant who is indicted for murder exercises his right to stand trial by jury and is convicted of murder in the first degree he must receive a sentence of life imprisonment. However, if he pleads non vult to the same indictment, he becomes eligible to receive a sentence for any term of years not exceeding 30 years and even have such sentence suspended. N. J. S. A. 2A:168-1.
The majority opinion states that the issue is whether this scheme results in the “needless encouragement” of guilty pleas. It is that in part, but of equal importance, here it penalized a defendant who exercised his right to stand trial. Por that he had a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him. I agree with the late Chief Justice Weintraub that such a sentencing scheme would and does present “a JacTcson-type difficulty 1 in that one who stood trial would receive a life sentence for first-degree murder while a defendant whose non vult plea was accepted could receive *404 a sentence for a term of years.” State v. Forcella, 52 N. J. 263, 282 (1968).
• Various alternatives would be constitutionally permissible. One would be to abolish the non vult plea to the indictment and instead provide that a defendant would not be permitted to plead guilty to murder in the first degree but only to second degree murder. Also, the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder could be changed so as to vest discretion in the sentencing judge. This latter solution would appear to be the more desirable because mandatory sentences, while they have been held to pass constitutional muster, bar a sentencing judge from taking into account facts and circumstances which otherwise might properly be relevant in fixing sentence.
• The majority opinion holds that the separate classification for sentencing purposes of those who plead non vult to murder and those who choose to stand trial has a rational purpose akin to our system of plea negotiations. I see a substantial difference. Plea negotiations as noted in the majority opinion legitimately take into account a guilty defendant’s willingness to admit such guilt and thereby conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources. A sentencing 'judge, in his discretion, may take such a plea of guilt into consideration in fixing the degree of punishment. However, a sentencing scheme which presents the threat of penalizing a defendant because he pleads not guilty and demands a jury trial, is not the same thing.
I am concerned about a defendant who pleads non vult to an indictment for murder in order to avoid the risk of a; mandatory life sentence if he stands trial. I am equally concerned about a defendant who exercises his constitutional right to stand trial on the same indictment and because he does so, as here, now faces a mandatory life sentence. To me, in addition to presenting a Jacicson-type difficulty, this involves a denial of equal protection of the laws.
I would invalidate the mandatory life sentence provision of the statute, vacate the life sentence imposed on de *405 fendant and remand the matter to the trial court for. resentencing with the trial judge to exercise such discretion as-the circumstances warrant.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 , 88 S. Ct. 1209 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1968).