The opinion
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because there is no evidence to support the jury’s finding that the City of Keller (“City”) acted with intent to inversely condemn the Wilsons’ property.
To establish a claim for inverse condemnation, a plaintiff must plead and prove that: (1) the governmental entity intentionally performed certain acts; (2) that resulted in a taking of property; (3) for public use. 1 Under Texas law, a “taking” for inverse condemnation purposes is defined as physical appropriation or invasion of property, or unreasonable interference with a landowner’s right to use and enjoy the property. 2 It is not enough that the governmental entity know or should know *718 that its conduct involves a serious risk or likelihood of causing a taking; it must either act for the purpose of causing the taking or know that a taking is substantially certain to result from its conduct, 3
According to the majority, the jury could infer that the City knew that flooding of the Wilsons’ property was substantially certain to result from the decision not to build an easement on the Wilsons’ property, based on evidence showing that the City knew that development of the property upstream from the Wilsons’ property would cause water to be absorbed less and flow faster through the developed property. At best, however, this evidence merely supports an inference that the City knew that the absence of the easement would create a serious risk or likelihood that water flowing downstream from the developed property would flood the Wil-sons’ property; it does not, as it must under the controlling law cited by the majority, support an inference that the City knew that flooding was substantially certain to result from its decision not to build the easement. 4
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment for inverse condemnation and render judgment that the Wilsons take nothing on their inverse condemnation claim.
. Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex. Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex.2001); Bennett v. Tarrant County Water Control Imp. Dist. No. One, 894 S.W.2d 441, 448 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
. See Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex.1992).
. Ford Motor Co. v. Dallas Power & Light, 499 F.2d 400 , 409 n. 16 (5th Cir.1974); Houston v. Renault, 431 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex.1968); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965).
. See Ford Motor Co., 499 F.2d at 409 n. 16; Houston, 431 S.W.2d at 325 ; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A.