concluding that the defendant’s “unexplained temporary placement on jail suicide watch and an impulsive physical act in response to his conviction of first-degree murder” did not undermine the court’s finding that the defendant was competent at the time of trial
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the defendant’s “unexplained temporary placement on jail suicide watch and an impulsive physical act in response to his conviction of first-degree murder” did not undermine the court’s finding that the defendant was competent at the time of trial
- holding that, in relation to claims deriving from the absence of an appropriate objection at trial, a post-conviction petitioner may not rely on the prima facie case under Batson, but rather, must prove actual, purposeful discrimination
- explaining that “most claims arising out of a trial (including claims of trial court error and ineffective assistance of trial counsel) are waived if not raised and preserved at the time of trial and/or in the direct appeal”
- reasoning that a mitigation-based claim was previously litigated where the reasoning on direct appeal, while perhaps not shared by all Justices, fully answered the claim presented at the post-conviction stage
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Commonwealth v. Jones, 597 Pa. 286 (2008)
Appellant nevertheless maintains that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005), decided one week before this Court’s remand in the instant case, calls into question the applicability of Uderra.
The opinion
Justice NEWMAN,
concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion, but write separately to dissociate myself from Mr. Justice Saylor’s adoption, albeit via *535 footnote, of the view of the Third Circuit in Holloway that our procedural requirements for the development of a full and complete record to establish ,a prima facie case of a Batson violation are an unreasonable application of federal law. Compare Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 728-29 (3d Cir.2004) with Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233 , 627 A.2d 1176, 1182-83 (1993). As Mr. Justice Saylor properly recognizes in the text of the Opinion: “A majority of this Court is of the view that it would represent dictum to undertake in this case to reconsider the validity of the Spence requirements in light of the Third Circuit’s Holloway decision.” Op. at 86. Nevertheless, in a footnote of the same Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor explains that he “is of a contrary view” and would prefer to undertake a reconsideration of our time-honored procedural requirements for establishing a prima facie case under Bat-son. Id. at 86 n. 12. As Mr. Justice Saylor acknowledges, however, the Commonwealth in this case has neither specifically addressed nor defended the validity of the Spence requirements before this Court. Therefore, absent an adequate presentation of adversarial arguments, we should at least temporarily delay the reconsideration of our precedent. Because the decisions of the Third Circuit regarding federal law are merely persuasive authority for this Court to contemplate and weigh, see Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa.2004), 1 we should not abandon our long-established jurisprudence until all parties involved in the proceedings have had an equal opportunity to develop and present meaningful arguments before us on this significant issue.
. While the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court did not garner a majority, six of seven Justices agreed with the general principle that decisions of an inferior federal court should be treated by this Court as persuasive authority where that decision interprets federal law.