Opinion

Shore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa.

  • 389 Pa. 445
  • 133 A.2d 157
  • 1957 Pa. LEXIS 385
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 3, 1957
Status
Published
Author
Cohen
On the bench
Musmanno, Stern, Jones, Bell, Ohidsey, Mtjsmanno, Arnold, Re-Argued, Chidsey, Cohen
Cited by
6 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.3%

The opinion

Dissenting Opinion by

Mb. Justice Cohen:

I dissent.

Section 7 (4) (b) of the plan does not, I believe, permit the committee to pay an amount less than the maximum. The vague standards set to guide the committee’s determination of the amount of benefits to be paid are inadequate to afford proper safeguards to the employes, and consequently, any other interpretation might well render the obligation of the defendant illusory.

In every contract which provides for the exercise of discretion by one of the parties thereto, there is an implied condition that the discretion will be properly exercised. Even assuming, therefore, that the committee had the authority to exercise discretion in determining the amount of benefit payments, it had to exercise that discretion in good faith and within the bounds of a reasonable judgment. Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370 , 105 A. 2d 67 (1954); see also 56 C.J.S. 834 (1948) (cases collected).

The Bell Telephone Company contends that the standard to be followed under section 7 (4) (b) is “consideration [of] the degree of dependency [of the bene *459 ficiary] and such other facts as [the committee] may deem pertinent.” Under the established public policy of the Commonwealth, 1 there is no higher degree of dependency than that of a needy wife, not living with her husband through no fault of her own, and a needy, widoived mother.

The committee awarded the wife the sum of $1044 and the mother, $312. It could not, in good conscience, have given partially dependent distant relatives much less. Such a lack of consideration for the closeness of the relationship, as Avell as the degree of dependency, herein involved indicates either that the committee did not exercise mature judgment, or that its determination was actuated by bad faith. In my judgment, dependent Avives and mothers merit maximum payments, and on that basis, without contemplation of any other factors, I Avould affirm the judgment of the lower court.

See, for example, The Support Law, Act of June 24, 1987, P. L. 2045, as amended, 62 P.S. §§1971-1977 (Supp.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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