concluding that the defendant’s claim that expert testimony could have refuted the Commonwealth’s theory of the case was purely speculative, and the defendant failed to show how this evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial in light of the other evidence; accordingly, the defendant failed to establish prejudice
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the defendant’s claim that expert testimony could have refuted the Commonwealth’s theory of the case was purely speculative, and the defendant failed to show how this evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial in light of the other evidence; accordingly, the defendant failed to establish prejudice
- holding petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective in failing to call at second trial witnesses who testified at his first trial, where he “made no proffer as to whether these witnesses were willing and able to testify at [his] second trial, much less that they would stick to their stories
- holding that the appellant’s failure to demonstrate that the proposed witnesses “were willing and able to testify” at his trial prevented him from establishing that “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present th[e] witnesses”
- explaining that a showing of good cause under Rule 902(E)(2) requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence that might be discovered if the petitioner is permitted to review requested materials
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR.
DISSENTING OPINION
I agree with the majority that a criminal defendant is charged with the consequences of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel at trial. The majority appears to frame these consequences categorically, see Majority Opinion, op. at 146-47, 855 A.2d at 741-43 (“Because appellant waived his right to counsel and asserted his right to self-representation, ... we will not consider any ineffectiveness claims that arise from the period of self-representation.”), without any express consideration of the line of cases cited in Appellant’s brief holding that a failure on the part of standby counsel to *163 adequately perform the limited role assigned to him by a trial court can implicate errors of constitutional dimension. See Brief of Appellant at 18-19 & n. 14. 1 Since Appellant has presented at least one of his issues in such terms, see Brief of Appellant at 54, I believe that the Court should expressly address the question in light of the relevant arguments and authorities. On review of the record and with the relevant principles in mind, in the end I am able to join the majority’s ultimate disposition of this claim.
I also differ with the majority’s approach to Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call witnesses, as I believe that Appellant should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 909 requires an evidentiary hearing, unless it can be said, inter alia, that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(b). Appellant has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the failure to present witnesses at trial, and has submitted an evidentiary proffer which includes affidavits from five witnesses which, if credited by a fact finder, would implicate another individual as the killer. Therefore, under Rule 909(b), I believe that a hearing was warranted. Accord Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 231-33 , 732 A.2d 1167, 1180-81 (1999) (remanding for the post-conviction court to hold a hearing to make an independent credibility determination as to recantation testimony).
The majority lays out a fairly compelling case to support its proposition that the proffered affidavits simply are not credible and, therefore, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. This determination, however, is made from the appellate van *164 tage in the first instance, on a cold record, without the benefit of any input from a fact finder. Nor does the majority articulate a general rule concerning when it will and will not permit summary disposition of a claim based on an evidentiary proffer that, if believed, would undermine the reliability of the verdict and sentence. The rule thus appears to be that if the common pleas court believes that at least four members of this Court will ultimately say that they do not believe the evidentiary proffer, then no hearing is necessary.
My position is that the Court would give better effect to the values of regularity and fairness that are essential to the judicial function by requiring closer and more consistent adherence to the procedures that have been designed to ensure the reliability of criminal convictions, particularly in the capital arena, where the need for reliability is at its greatest. Accordingly, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing and appropriate fact finding and decision making at the common pleas level regarding Appellant’s proffer.
. See also People v. Bloom, 48 Cal.3d 1194 , 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698, 718 (1989) ("To prevail on a claim that counsel acting in an advisory or other limited capacity has rendered ineffective assistance, a self-represented defendant must show that counsel failed to perform competently within the limited scope of the duties assigned to or assumed by counsel .... ” (emphasis omitted)); see also Ali v. United States, 581 A.2d 368, 379-80 (D.C.Cir.1990) (same); Downey v. People, 25 P.3d 1200, 1204 (Colo.2001) (same); State v. Thomas, 331 N.C. 671 , 417 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1992) (same); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 676, 725-735 (2000).