finding that Sweitzer violated MRPC 8.4(c) by making two misrepresentations—presenting the Gift Certification Form to the MVA for a vehicle he purchased at auction and misrepresenting that he had his former wife’s authority to sign the Gift Certification Form on her behalf—in an effort to avoid payment of a vehicle sales tax and inspection fee
How later courts described this case
- finding that Sweitzer violated MRPC 8.4(c) by making two misrepresentations—presenting the Gift Certification Form to the MVA for a vehicle he purchased at auction and misrepresenting that he had his former wife’s authority to sign the Gift Certification Form on her behalf—in an effort to avoid payment of a vehicle sales tax and inspection fee
- concluding that indefinite suspension, rather than disbarment, was warranted for an attorney who signed his wife’s name on a Motor Vehicle Administration title-transfer form without her authority because the respondent’s “violations were not a pattern of misconduct”
- finding that Sweitzer violated MRPC 8.4(c
- attorney violated MLRPC 8.4(c) after misrepresenting ownership of a vehicle to the Motor Vehicle Administration in order to avoid paying a sales tax
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
HARRELL, J., which GREENE, J., joins.
I do not quarrel with the Majority’s starting (and ending) point that an indefinite suspension is appropriate here. My departure from that conclusion is that I would qualify it with a right to reapply no sooner than ninety days.
I agree that Sweitzer’s intent in the matter of the complaint of Bar Counsel is indistinguishable from that of the cases mentioned in the Majority opinion at slip op. 14-18. Yet, where each attorney in those cases received significant monetary gain or benefit from his or her consummated misconduct, Sweitzer’s conduct not only fell short of his actually receiving a monetary benefit from his misguided efforts, i.e., his was an unconsummated attempt withdrawn at the last moment by his own hand, the potential gain from the attempt was exceedingly modest ($135) compared to the facts of the open-ended indefinite suspension cases discussed by the Majority.
One may dispute whether an open-ended indefinite suspension is a lesser sanction than one qualified with a right to reapply no sooner than a minimum period of time. Under the *607 former, a respondent may seek and be granted readmission theoretically at any time after the effective date of the suspension. That notwithstanding, I am of the view that such an open-ended indefinite suspension can, in practice, be more onerous than a minimum “sit-out” time indefinite suspension because at least the latter offers some clue to a respondent when the Court deems it most likely appropriate to reapply with some hope for success. The open-ended version leaves a respondent usually and completely in the dark as to when it is most propitious to reapply, and fosters potentially multiple frustrating attempts at seeking readmission until the Court, in its infinite wisdom, grants one (if ever). While there certainly are cases that merit that approach, this is not one of them, in my judgment.
Judge Greene authorizes me to state that he joins this dissent.