The opinion
Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I concur in the result reached by the majority but do so only after considering, as the majority fails to do, “the questions raised concerning comprehensive plan and the promotion of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.” In my view, a finding of illegal “spot zoning” must necessarily involve consideration of those matters.
Confusion arises in this area of zoning law because of the dichotomy of meaning attributed to the term “spot zoning”. In some instances, “spot zoning” is used in a descriptive sense connoting the geographical isolation of a small parcel of land which is zoned either more or less restrictively than the property which surrounds it. When used in that sense, “spot zoning” is not necessarily invalid. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §25.84 (3d ed. rev. Supp. 1963); Annot., Spot Zoning §2, 51 A.L.R. 2d 263 ,266 (1957). On the other hand, the term “spot zoning” is also used to indicate the legal conclusion that such zoning, under the circumstances of a particular case, is invalid.
In our cases “spot zoning” has been employed as a legal term indicating invalidity rather than as. a mere descriptive term characterizing the rezoned area. See, e.g., French, v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 479 , 184 A. 2d 791 (1962); Schmidt v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 382 Pa. 521 , 114 A. 2d 902 (1955); Gratton v. Conte, 364 Pa. 578 , 73 A. 2d 381 (1950); Boyle Appeal, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 318 , 116 A. 2d 860 (1955); Putney v. Abington Township, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 463 , 108 A. 2d 134 (1954).
*213 The general rule is that “if a change of zone is reasonable and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan of the zoning ordinance and can be justified as contributing to the public health, safety and general welfare, it will not be held invalid as ‘spot zoning,’ even though the reclassification affects only a single piece of property or may incidentally discriminate in favor of the owner thereof.” (Footnotes omitted.) 1 Ratlikopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 26-14 (1962). See Clark v. City of Boulder, 146 Colo. 526 , 362 P. 2d 160 (1961); Luery v. Zoning Bd. of City of Stamford, 150 Conn. 136 , 187 A. 2d 247 (1962); England v. Mayor and Council of Rockville, 230 Md. 43 , 185 A. 2d 378 (1962); Weber v. City of Grand Island, 165 Neb. 827 , 87 N.W. 2d 575 (1958); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238 , 104 A. 2d 441 (1954); Thomas v. Town of Bedford, 11 N.Y. 2d 428 , 184 N.E. 2d 285 , 230 N.Y.S. 2d 684 (1962). “Thus, the validity or invalidity of ‘spot’ or ‘island’ zoning [used descriptively] depends upon more than the size of the ‘spot’ or the fact that it is surrounded by uses of another character than those for which the ‘spot’ is zoned.” 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §25.84 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
In Boyle Appeal, 179 Pa. Superior Ct. 318, 327 , 116 A. 2d 860, 866 (1955), it was held that “where a small parcel of land is classified differently from all the surrounding area for no apparent reason or purpose except to favor the owner, it is referred to as ‘spot zoning’ and is invalid because it is discriminatory.” (Emphasis supplied.) See Schmidt v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 382 Pa. 521 , 114 A. 2d 902 (1955); Gratton v. Conte, 364 Pa. 578 , 73 A. 2d 381 (1950).
Indeed, the majority reaffirms this point when it states that “the amendatory ordinance creates a commercially zoned island in a residentially zoned sea and, unless a proper basis appears for such special treat *214 ment, cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, by stating that it is unnecessary to discuss or decide the question of comprehensive plan and the promotion of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, the majority ignores evidence of the very “proper basis” which it has said would justify special treatment. The majority opinion implies, therefore, that such “proper basis” can only be found in some distinguishing physical characteristic which sets the land apart from the surrounding area. Our consideration of a zoning ordinance should not be so confined, however, for the reason that zoning involves many complex factors, the mere “lay of the land” being only one of them.
It is incumbent upon us to consider the purported justification for the rezoning and determine if it does adhere to a comprehensive plan and if it does promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. In the instant case, I can find no merit in the arguments advanced in that regard by appellee and, for that reason, I agree that the zoning change here attempted constituted invalid “spot zoning”.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this concurring opinion.