“while the facts constituting undue prejudice ... must usually be expressly demonstrated, special situations do exist where such a showing is either presumed, or need not be made at all.”
How later courts described this case
- “while the facts constituting undue prejudice ... must usually be expressly demonstrated, special situations do exist where such a showing is either presumed, or need not be made at all.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority correctly concludes that if the doctrine of laches is not raised at the administrative level it is waived. It recognizes that even if it might sometimes be fruitless to argue to an administrative body that its actions were barred by delay, we should not allow the parties to avoid the general principle that all issues must be raised at the earliest possible time to avoid waiver. Inexplicably, it then artifically avoids the consequences of that conclusion.
Applied to the facts before us, the majority’s reasoning should result in a holding that the laches issue has been waived. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority’s mandate. In Weinberg v. State Board of Examiners, 509 Pa. 239 , 501 A.2d 143 (1985), we stated that allowing a party to plead laches in an administrative proceeding was part of a “consistent body of case law in Commonwealth Court.” 509 Pa. at 151, 501 A.2d at 244. Nevertheless, the majority permits this appellee to claim surprise. I fail to grasp that reasoning. In the face of a “consistent body of case law in Commonwealth Court,” appellee was charged with notice that the laches issue could be raised below. So charged, she failed to raise it. That failure would have resulted in a waiver under any ordinary application of the term. I would remand the case to Commonwealth Court only for disposition of the remaining issues in the case.
NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, J., join in this dissenting opinion.