Because “fresh complaint of rape” does not have guarantees of trustworthiness of spontaneous utterance, “the bare fact of the complaint may be introduced only for the purposes of corroboration [and] not for the truth of the matter asserted therein.”
How later courts described this case
- Because “fresh complaint of rape” does not have guarantees of trustworthiness of spontaneous utterance, “the bare fact of the complaint may be introduced only for the purposes of corroboration [and] not for the truth of the matter asserted therein.”
- admitted testimony "should be limited to the fact that a complaint was made”
- forestalls jurors’ inference that if there is no evidence of a prompt complaint of rape, there was no such report, and if no report was made, no crime occurred
- "Whatever may be the law elsewhere, the corroboration threshold has never been difficult to cross in this jurisdiction. For example, reasonably prompt reporting of the incident to one's family, friends or police is considered corroboration here. . . ."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I see no justification for requiring corroboration in sex offenses based upon distinctions between a “mature” female complainant (see Arnold v. United States, D.C.App., 358 A.2d 335 (1976) (en banc)) or any other complainant — male or female, adult or minor. In this en banc posture again, and having taken the route we took in Arnold , I agree with Chief Judge Newman, that with appropriate safeguards, we should abolish the requirement across the board.
I respectfully dissent.