finding that a search pursuant to a parole agreement is permissible when “(1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a search pursuant to a parole agreement is permissible when “(1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer”
- reaffirming that Pennsylvania Constitution provides parolee with no greater protection than United States Constitution in area of warrantless searches of parolee’s residence, where parolee has signed agreement to allow search of his premises as condition of parole
- concluding that a group of three twelve- to fourteen- year-old girls standing on the porch of the defendant’s house had apparent authority to consent to a search of a home
- holding that there was apparent authority where the consenting individuals opened the front door of the apartment for the police officers
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Commonwealth v. Basking, 2009 Pa. Super. 67 (2009)
Given Hughes and this Court’s decision in Quiles, we find that Edmunds is inapplicable to the matter at hand and that its holding cannot reasonably be extended to encompass the apparent authority doctrine.
The opinion
Justice LAMB
concurring.
The Commonwealth offered two theories in resisting Appellant’s suppression motion below: (1) that the search was lawful given the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of parolees and the authority given to parole agents to conduct warrantless searches codified at Section 27.2b(b) of the Act of *469 August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, No. 323, added by the Act of November 17, 1995, P.L. 1139, No. 35, 61 P.S. § 331.27b; and (2) the third party consent to enter the residence given by the teenage girls who opened the door and accompanied the officers into the building. The trial court, the Superior Court, and the instant majority have rejected theory (1) while accepting theory (2). I write separately to indicate my view that the search was lawful not under theory (2) but under theory (1).
As Judge Klein reasoned in dissent below, the officers here had no objective reason to believe that the teenage girls possessed authority to consent to the search. Neither did the officers pose any questions to the girls in an attempt to explore the nature and origin of any authority they might possess. All that was known was that the girls were present outside the residence and that they opened the (apparently unlocked) door and accompanied the officers inside. These facts include no objective indicia of consensual authority. Moreover, the knowledge of Parole Officer Vines concerning Appellant’s familial and living circumstances provided no basis for and, in fact, militated strongly against any conclusion that these girls possessed such authority.
On the other hand, the circumstances (including Appellant’s presence at a nearby corner just minutes earlier wearing distinctive yellow headphones and the observation of those same headphones immediately inside the residence) were more than sufficient to indicate that Appellant was present somewhere within the residence. However, as it reasonably appeared to the officers, the teenage girls, for reasons unknown, were falsely denying Appellant’s presence. In my view, these facts are sufficient, in the case of a parolee like Appellant who has consented in advance to warrantless searches of his residence by his parole agent, to justify a cursory inspection of each room of the residence, beginning with Appellant’s room, sufficient only to determine whether Appellant was present. It appears that this is the course taken by the officers. The officers’ plan to discuss with Appellant his recent reported parole violations was a legitimate part of the investigation of “violations of the conditions *470 of supervision” for which authority to conduct a warrantless search of a parolee’s property has been granted by 61 P.S. § 331.27b(d)(2). Moreover, the circumstances expressly justifying the conduct of a warrantless search of a parolee’s residence by a parole officer as codified at 61 P.S. § 331.27b(d)(6)(viii) include “[t]he need to verify compliance with the conditions of supervision”; precisely the subject on which the officers here wished to question Appellant. I would hold that the decision of the suppression court was correct on these grounds.