finding that a search pursuant to a parole agreement is permissible when “(1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer”
How later courts described this case
- finding that a search pursuant to a parole agreement is permissible when “(1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer”
- reaffirming that Pennsylvania Constitution provides parolee with no greater protection than United States Constitution in area of warrantless searches of parolee’s residence, where parolee has signed agreement to allow search of his premises as condition of parole
- concluding that a group of three twelve- to fourteen- year-old girls standing on the porch of the defendant’s house had apparent authority to consent to a search of a home
- holding that there was apparent authority where the consenting individuals opened the front door of the apartment for the police officers
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Commonwealth v. Basking, 2009 Pa. Super. 67 (2009)
Given Hughes and this Court’s decision in Quiles, we find that Edmunds is inapplicable to the matter at hand and that its holding cannot reasonably be extended to encompass the apparent authority doctrine.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR
concurring.
I agree with Mr. Chief Justice Cappy’s analysis regarding the majority’s application of the apparent authority exception under the present circumstances. See Dissenting Opinion at 470-72, 836 A.2d at 907-08. I nevertheless concur in the majority disposition, as I agree with Mr. Justice Lamb that the warrantless search of Appellant’s approved parole residence in order to locate him was valid under the parole exception. I write only because I would treat the two aspects of that exception distinctly.
As a threshold matter, in the absence of consent or a statutory framework, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the warrantless search of a parolee’s residence based upon reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Pickron, 535 Pa. 241, 249-50 , 634 A.2d 1093, 1098 (1993). The Court subsequently addressed the issue of consent in Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577 , 692 A.2d 1031 (1997), and held that, where a parolee signs a parole *468 agreement giving his parole officer permission to conduct a warrantless search, the search will be deemed reasonable if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that: (1) the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the parole officers duty. See id. at 588 , 692 A.2d at 1036 . In addition, the General Assembly added Section 27b to the Probation and Parole Act, 1 which authorizes, inter alia, the search of real property in the possession of or under the control of a parolee where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that such property contains “contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” 61 P.S. 331.27b(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, Williams and Section 27b provide alternate bases for upholding a search under the parole exception.
In my view, the search of Appellant’s approved parole residence was valid under both. Initially, there is no dispute that Officer Vines had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant violated his parole. See Majority Opinion, at 458, 836 A.2d at 899. I am, therefore, of the view that the officer’s conduct, in searching Appellant’s residence to locate him and discuss those violations, was “reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty” of confirming those violations. In addition, I would hold that the search was statutorily authorized, since, as observed by Mr. Justice Lamb, it was based upon reasonable suspicion that the residence contained “evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision,” namely, evidence that could be obtained by speaking to Appellant himself.
. Act of Aug. 6, 1941, P.L. 861, No. 323, § 27.2, added by Act of Nov. 17, 1995, P.L. 1139, No. 35 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 1 (codified at 61 P.S. § 331.27b).