holding that an interaction in which law enforcement officers boarded a passenger bus upon a scheduled terminal stop; upon reaching the appellant’s seat, requested to view her identification and ticket; and asked questions regarding her destination and luggage, did not amount to a seizure
How later courts described this case
- holding that an interaction in which law enforcement officers boarded a passenger bus upon a scheduled terminal stop; upon reaching the appellant’s seat, requested to view her identification and ticket; and asked questions regarding her destination and luggage, did not amount to a seizure
- holding that interaction where police boarded a stopped passenger bus and, upon reaching the appellant’s seat, requested to view her identification and ticket and asked questions regarding her destination and luggage, did not amount to a seizure but remained a mere encounter
- holding that the request by an officer for a suspect to exit a bus and answer ques *440 tions in a public parking lot regarding a bag containing cocaine found on the bus did not create a circumstance that would require Miranda warnings
- stating that "[t]his Court has indeed accorded greater protections to the citizens of this state under Article I, Section 8, than under the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances ..." (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice NIGRO,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion as I believe that the interaction between Smith and the officers on the bus constituted an unlawful seizure.
Here, as the majority notes, the officers boarded the bus, identified themselves as police officers, and explained to the passengers the purpose of the interdiction. The officers approached Smith who was in the front row, asked to see her ticket and identification, and inquired about her luggage. While talking with Smith, one officer stood in the stairwell of the bus and the other stood behind her. In support of its determination that this interaction between Smith and the officers did not amount to a seizure, the majority relies upon the fact that the officers did not block the aisle, brandish a weapon, raise their voices, threaten Smith, or accuse her of criminal conduct. However, as I explained in both the opinion in support of reversal in Commonwealth v. Boswell, 554 Pa. 275 , 721 A.2d 336 (1998), and my dissenting opinion in Com *227 monwealth v. Dowds, 568 Pa. 377 , 761 A.2d 1125, 1132 (2000), police officers inherently display their authority and are intimidating solely by virtue of their position. Thus, when an officer approaches a person and identifies himself as a police officer, even if that officer never brandishes a weapon and never speaks in anything but a conversational and non-accusatory tone of voice, an average person, in reality, simply does not feel “free to leave” and accordingly, is seized. 1
As I believe that an average person would not feel free to leave under the circumstances here, Smith was, in my mind, illegally seized and I would therefore reverse the order of the Superior Court.
. In Boswell , I suggested that police should give the following warning when conducting a random stop of someone based upon a drug courier profile:
We are police officers investigating drug trafficking. We approached you on a purely random basis and would like to ask you some questions. You have a legal right to decline our requests, a right to refuse to cooperate, and you are free to leave. If you choose not to leave and to comply with our requests, anything revealed through those inquires may be used against you in legal proceedings. Furthermore, if you agree to cooperate at the outset, you may still refuse at any time to cooperate further; you may end the inquiry and leave. Do you understand that you are under no obligation to comply with our requests at this time?
721 A.2d at 344 n. 1.