police had initial authority to make warrantless entry pursuant to emergency aid exception where they received a report of shooting at house and arrived to see the door ajar, making visible a shoe and a pool of blood; but police did not have authority to conduct a further search of the apartment without a warrant after they failed to discover anyone in need of assistance within
How later courts described this case
- police had initial authority to make warrantless entry pursuant to emergency aid exception where they received a report of shooting at house and arrived to see the door ajar, making visible a shoe and a pool of blood; but police did not have authority to conduct a further search of the apartment without a warrant after they failed to discover anyone in need of assistance within
- "Hennessy could have stayed on the scene for the short period it took the others to arrive, thus not triggering the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment.” (Nebeker, J., concurring)
- law enforcement officials could not seize evidence in plain view, some of which had been initially viewed by an officer lawfully on the scene, during a warrantless reentry of the premises
- reentry of officers to conduct general search for evidence unconstitutional without a warrant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
concurring:
*1140 I agree that Thompson 1 and Mincey 2 are controlling here. But, unlike those cases, this case does not present a scope of search problem. Here, the evidence, including bullets, bullet holes, and a blood covered bag, were all seized in plain view shortly after the commission of the crime. Thus the crucial question is the validity of the actual entries made by officers Dryden, Stiftar, and Gmitter. Hennessy’s entry and observations are concededly valid. The majority asserts that the procurement of a search warrant was the only way to legitimate the other officers’ entries. True enough, since Hennessy had secured and departed the premises prior to their arrival. However, Hennessy could have stayed on the scene for the short period it took the others to arrive, thus not triggering the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413.
. Thompson v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 409 , 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984).
. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).