holding that a trial court “should not totally reject an entire line of otherwise relevant inquiry,” but should “mold [an impermissibly broad ____________________________________________ 10 The IDS Life Insurance policy was issued on August 15, 1996. - 20 - J-A07023-15 question] into an acceptably limited form”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a trial court “should not totally reject an entire line of otherwise relevant inquiry,” but should “mold [an impermissibly broad ____________________________________________ 10 The IDS Life Insurance policy was issued on August 15, 1996. - 20 - J-A07023-15 question] into an acceptably limited form”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion extends the holding of Commonwealth v. Brown, 464 Pa. 625 , 347 A.2d 716 (1975), as well as our own recent cases of Commonwealth v. Fulton, 271 Pa.Super. 430 , 413 A.2d 742 (1979) and Commonwealth v. Mosley, 261 Pa.Super. 198 , 395 A.2d 1384 (1978). I am unable to find any prior Pennsylvania case that has previously held that voir dire query must be permitted as to any crime. The majority opinion today allows a general question which will produce results that in my opinion have no *59 general relevancy in focusing upon the precise area of the criminal law involved. Further, such inquiry will have a tendency to harass potential jurors in that it will require them to reveal insignificant matters that may have happened years ago in situations that would have absolutely no bearing on the case to be tried before them.
It has been, as the majority notes, traditionally vested in the trial judge’s discretion to rule upon the scope and extent of the voir dire examination. In my judgment it is grievous error to label the trial judge’s action in this case as an abuse of that traditional discretion.
I wish also to register my complete disagreement with the majority in further imposing the additional duty upon trial judges of molding an unacceptable and improper voir dire question into an “acceptable limited form” (p. 674). I agree with the appellee that such a duty will invite “sloth or potential abuse” on the part of defense attorneys. Additionally, it imposes an unnecessary and unwarranted new duty upon the judge.
Further, Judge Wieand, writing for the panel in the original disposition of this case at 264 Pa. Super. 574 , 400 A.2d 1320 (1979), and the majority in this en banc disposition, noted that the trial judge not only failed to narrow the area of inquiry but “effectively precluded” counsel from propounding any questions dealing with victimization of crime. I do not find any such action on the part of the trial judge in the record I have examined. It is my view of the record that upon the trial judge’s refusal to allow the question concerning any crime, appellant’s attorney made no further request. 1 I do not interpret such action as effectively precluding any questions dealing with victimization of relevant crimes.
*60 There are seven other issues raised in this appeal that have no merit. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
CAVANAUGH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
. On page three of the partial Transcript the trial judge refused the question. No objection or exception was noted by appellant’s counsel. On page four of the same transcript appellant’s counsel was asked, “Are there any other questions you want to ask, Mr. Murdoch? Mr. Murdoch answered. “No, Your Honor.”