holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish specific intent to kill where the defendant repeatedly beat the three -year -old victim, threw her into a metal radiator, which struck her head, and leaving her to suffocate
How later courts described this case
- holding that the evidence was sufficient to establish specific intent to kill where the defendant repeatedly beat the three -year -old victim, threw her into a metal radiator, which struck her head, and leaving her to suffocate
- confirming the lack of merit to the “final fatal blow” argument and finding specific intent to kill where the defendant engaged in a continued pattern of child abuse and ultimately threw the three-year-old child across the room into a radiator and left her to suffocate between a bed and a wall
- declining to review waived issues that derived from strategic decisions of the defendant’s trial counsel under the guise of an “arbitrary fact” for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)’s statutory review
- sustaining jury’s finding of torture where the defendant fatally beat the three-year old victim, forcefully threw her into a radiator, and then catapulted the child behind a bed where she was left to suffocate to death
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice TODD,
concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion, with one exception. In addressing Appellant’s claim of a putative Caldwell 1 violation, see Majority Op. at 257-65, 980 A.2d at 55-59, the Majority broadly concludes that, on direct capital appeal, ineffectiveness of counsel claims may not form the basis for an assertion that a sentence of death “was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3). I do not agree with the Majority that our statutorily-mandated *267 review under Section 9711(h)(3) may be foreclosed simply because the claim is based in ineffectiveness.
The Majority focuses on our decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), wherein this Court determined that criminal litigants, as a general rule, must wait until collateral review to raise ineffectiveness claims. Grant was based on prudential concerns that, in the absence of a developed record, appellate courts were poorly equipped to make the type of assessments that ineffectiveness claims could require. See Grant, 572 Pa. at 65-67 , 813 A.2d at 737-38 ; id. at 67 , 813 A.2d at 738 (“Deferring review of trial counsel ineffectiveness claims until the collateral review stage of the proceedings offers a petitioner the best avenue to effect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”). Nevertheless, it is evident to me that, regardless of their merit, Grant’s practical considerations may not override our statutory duties under Section 9711 to assess whether a sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor. Absent constitutional impediment, we may not decline that statutory duty.
Furthermore, it is insufficient compliance with that duty, to my mind, that such review may obtain in post-conviction proceedings. Under Section 9711(h), a sentence of death is subject to automatic review by this Court, and that statute obligates this Court to affirm a sentence of death unless, inter alia, we determine it is the product of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor — whether or not a litigant raises such a contention. By my reading, execution of that mandate may not be deferred to potential collateral proceedings, and a claim implicating that assessment, based on counsel’s ineffectiveness or otherwise, may likewise not be deferred.
I recognize the Majority’s practical concern that review under Section 9711(h)(3) could swallow the Grant rule for penalty-phase claims, Majority Op. at 224 & n. 12, 980 A.2d at 59 & n. 12, and I would support limitations that did not substantively undermine our statutory obligations. Notwithstanding my position, it is sufficient for disposition of the *268 present case to observe that Appellant’s Caldwell claim clearly-lacked merit, as the Majority cogently explained. See Majority Op. at 260-65, 980 A.2d at 55-59.
. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).