noting that if the statute had instead stated “an action involving a landlord and a tenant,” the District Court’s jurisdiction would be “practically limitless” and reasoning that the phrasing “an action involving the landlord-tenant relationship” would render the separate mention of actions for distraint, forcible entry, and detainer superfluous (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- noting that if the statute had instead stated “an action involving a landlord and a tenant,” the District Court’s jurisdiction would be “practically limitless” and reasoning that the phrasing “an action involving the landlord-tenant relationship” would render the separate mention of actions for distraint, forcible entry, and detainer superfluous (emphasis added)
- describing summary ejectment as one of several “possessory in rem or quasi in rem actions that provide[] a means by which a landlord [may] rapidly and inexpensively obtain repossession of his premises... .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Eldridge, J.,
dissenting:
The General Assembly, in what is now codified as Maryland Code (1974), § 4-401 (4) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, granted to the District Court exclusive original jurisdiction in “An action involving landlord and tenant . . . regardless of the amount involved.” The majority opinion construes this grant as if the word “possessory” were inserted in the clause. However, the Legislature did not so qualify the language which it used. With all deference, I believe that the majority opinion ignores the principle that the words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assessments, 271 Md. 232, 237-238 , 315 A. 2d 758 (1974); Baltimore County v. White, 235 Md. 212, 218 , 201 A. 2d 358 (1964).
The phrase “landlord and tenant” is not unique to the statute delineating the jurisdiction of the District Court. It is the name given to Art. 53 of the Code and to Title VII of Art. 21 of the Code. The provisions of Art. 53 and Art. 21, Title VII, regulate and deal with the many aspects of the landlord and tenant relationship. The principal subject dealt with, in one manner or another, is the tenant’s obligation to pay rent. I can think of nothing which is more peculiarly *232 identified with the “landlord and tenant” relationship than a suit for rent due.
By employing the phrase “[a]n action involving landlord and tenant,” the Legislature intended that the District Court serve as the basic landlord-tenant court, to handle the typical disputes between landlords and tenants growing out of the landlord-tenant relationship. And the most typical dispute of this nature that I could imagine is the failure of the tenant to pay rent. In my view, both the district judge and the circuit judge correctly construed the statute. I would affirm.