Opinion

Commonwealth v. Guzman

  • 2012 Pa. Super. 93
  • 44 A.3d 688
  • 2012 Pa. Super. LEXIS 532
  • 2012 WL 1481527
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Apr 30, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Musmanno
On the bench
Files, Gantman, Musmanno, Stevens
Cited by
23 cases

following police officer’s -9- J-A27024-18 initial, mere encounter with defendant, officer’s subsequent frisk of defendant for weapons was justified under circumstances based on concerns for the officer’s safety, where defendant, who was acting erratically, jumped out of his vehicle in a high crime area and repeatedly reached into his pockets while simultaneously screaming his innocence.

How later courts described this case

  • following police officer’s -9- J-A27024-18 initial, mere encounter with defendant, officer’s subsequent frisk of defendant for weapons was justified under circumstances based on concerns for the officer’s safety, where defendant, who was acting erratically, jumped out of his vehicle in a high crime area and repeatedly reached into his pockets while simultaneously screaming his innocence.
  • where the defendant parked his vehicle and suddenly jumped out of it, leaving the door open, and the officer viewed drugs in plain view inside, the officer had a lawful right of access to seize the drugs under Pennsylvania’s limited automobile exception since the officer did not have advance knowledge that the defendant’s vehicle was involved in a crime

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DISSENTING OPINION BY

MUSMANNO, J.:

Because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the ruling of the suppression court, and its legal conclusions are sound, I must respectfully dissent. The evidence supports the suppression court’s conclusion that Officer Wetzel effectuated an investigative detention of Alexis Guzman (“Guzman”), which was not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

At 2:80 a.m. on March 10, 2010, Officer Wetzel observed a Sports Utility Vehicle (“SUV”) traveling in a high crime area. N.T., 11/12/10, at 6-7, 20. Officer Wetzel next observed a man walk past, traveling in the same direction, who then entered an apartment. Id. at 7. As the suppression court stated in its Opinion, “[t]he officer did not see any illegal or unusual actions on the part of either the SUV or the individual who walked into the apartment building.” Suppression Court Opinion, 4/29/11, at 2. Officer Wetzel drove in the direction taken by the SUV, and saw the SUV parked in a private driveway, with its headlights on. N.T., 11/12/10, at 7.

Notwithstanding the fact that Officer Wetzel had observed no criminal activity or unusual actions on the part of the SUV or the individual, he parked in the private driveway, behind the SUV. Id. From his marked police vehicle, Officer Wetzel then illuminated the SUV with a spot light. Id. at 9. At that time, the passenger inside of the vehicle, Alexis Guzman (“Guzman”), turned around and discovered a marked police vehicle, parked in the private driveway behind the SUV. Id. at 8. When Officer Wetzel saw the Guzman fidgeting, he approached the vehicle, at which time Guzman jumped out, setting off the car alarm. Id. at 9.

Unlike the Majority, I cannot conclude, based upon the above testimony, that Officer Wetzel’s initial contact with Guzman was a “mere encounter.” The Majority opines that Officer Wetzel needed no justification to park behind the SUV and approach it, as he is entitled to approach ordinary citizens “on the street” and ask a few questions. Slip Opinion at 9. The record reflects, however, that Officer Wetzel did not approach Guzman on the street. Officer Wetzel parked his marked police car behind the SUV, in a private driveway, and illuminated the SUV with a spotlight. No reasonable person would feel free to leave under these circumstances.

In addition, Officer Wetzel admitted that he did not observe any criminal activity by the SUV or the person walking on the street, prior to parking behind the SUV. *697 N.T., 11/12/10, at 23. Officer Wetzel also admitted that when he saw Guzman in the SUV, the officer saw no drugs, no weapons, and no indication that there were drugs and/or weapons. Id. at 29. Nevertheless, Officer Guzman approached the SUV. Id. When Guzman exited the vehicle, and deactivated its alarm, Officer Wetzel ordered Guzman to the back of the vehicle, where the officer handcuffed Guzman. Id. at 12, 33. Even though a pat-down search revealed no evidence of criminal activity, Officer Wetzel again approached the SUV, in the private driveway, and looked inside, discovering contraband under the seat Id. at 13, 34.

I also cannot agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the contraband falls within the ambit of the plain view doctrine. Officer Wetzel’s initial contact with Guzman cannot be considered a “mere encounter,” when the officer parked his marked police vehicle behind the SUV, in a private driveway, illuminating it with a spotlight. Further, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when Officer Wetzel approached the vehicle. Thus, when Officer Wetzel approached the vehicle, he did not view the contraband inside from a legal vantage point. For these reasons, I would uphold the suppression court’s ruling, as its findings are supported in the record and its legal conclusions are sound.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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