rejecting a challenge to a capital murder indictment on the grounds that it did not allege the death-qualifying aggravating factors that the State intended to prove
How later courts described this case
- rejecting a challenge to a capital murder indictment on the grounds that it did not allege the death-qualifying aggravating factors that the State intended to prove
- stating that “ ‘[.ojutweighing’ begins when a balance is ‘tipped,’ however slightly”
- “We have held on numerous occasions that the Maryland death penalty statute is constitutional.... ”
- applying the two-pronged approach in affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in a death penalty case
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RAKER, J.,
concurring in result only, joined by BELL, C.J. and ELDRIDGE, J.
I concur only in the judgment of the Court affirming appellant’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
As to the due process issue that appellant raises pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the majority affirms appellant’s sentence based on this Court’s holding in Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001). Appellant’s argument is that he was denied due process of law because Maryland Code (1978, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.) Art. 27, § 413(h) provides that a sen *699 tence of death may be imposed if the State proves that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances by a mere preponderance of the evidence. He argues that, based on Apprendi , due process and fundamental fairness require that the determination that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
I adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in Borchardt that Apprendi and fundamental fairness require that § 413(h) be interpreted to prescribe the reasonable doubt standard for the finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.
Nonetheless, I concur in the mandate of the majority opinion affirming appellant’s judgment of conviction because the Apprendi issue is not properly before the Court in this case. The trial judge, in sentencing appellant, found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that appellant had committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson, rape in the first degree, or sexual offense in the first degree. The trial judge also found that no mitigating circumstances existed by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no need to conduct a weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, and that imposition of the death penalty was mandatory in appellant’s case.
On its face, the weighing provision of § 413(h) applies only when the sentencing judge or a juror finds that one or more mitigating circumstances exist. See § 413(h)(1). Furthermore, Maryland Rule 4-343 instructs the sentencing authority that, if it determines that one or more aggravating circumstances has been proven and no mitigating circumstances exist, the sentence shall be death. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not unconstitutional for a state to require the death penalty when the sentencer has found one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 , 110 S.Ct. 1078 , 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). Therefore, *700 § 413(h) did not apply to appellant, and he cannot challenge its constitutionality in this case.
Accordingly, I join the majority in affirming appellant’s judgment of conviction.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge ELDRIDGE have authorized me to state that they join in this concurring opinion.