Singer v. Sheppard

NIX, Justice

(concurring).

I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, because of the importance of this issue and its far reaching effect, I believe it necessary to set forth my reasons for reaching this conclusion.

*418 The law is clear that the General Assembly has the power to abolish common law causes of action. Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110 , 117 A.2d 899 (1955); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158 , 106 A. 238 (1919). It is also beyond question that a legislature can create new causes of action. While recognizing these powers, the dissenters implicitly suggest that where they are exercised simultaneously and the new remedy provides less coverage than the former, Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution is necessarily violated. With this assumption, I cannot agree.

It is clear from the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Section 301(a) of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 1 and the purposes sought to be achieved by that enactment that the legislature recognized the desirability of eliminating the common law cause of action for pain and suffering from injuries resulting from automobile accidents. It is equally apparent that the legislature also determined the need for a right of recovery for selected classes of individuals. The mere fact that these two objectives were achieved in the same piece of legislation does not justify the conclusion suggested by the dissenters, that this is merely a limitation of a right to recovery which is prohibited under Article III, Section 18.

If we were to embrace the view of the dissenters, the power of the legislature to provide new remedies to replace common law remedies would be severely and unreasonably curtained. Whenever a cause of action is replaced by a newly created statutory remedy which is not co-extensive or more comprehensive, it could be argued, under their reasoning, that such action would constitute a limitation on the recovery of the former common law cause of action. Such a view would completely stifle progress and severely curtail the right of a legislature to *419 meet changing conditions and current needs. Basic constitutional law rejects such a restrictive interpretation of this provision.

Further, I am in agreement with Mr. Justice ROBERTS that the question of whether Section 301(a) is violative of the provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has not been properly raised in this lawsuit and need not at this time be considered.

Lastly, I am in complete accord with the majority in their conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution is not offended by this legislation. I believe that there is a reasonable basis for providing a right to sue for the specific classes designated under Section 301(a) for this type of loss. The only category that can possibly be questioned is that pertaining to those who sustained medical expenses in excess of $750. As recognized by Mr. Justice MANDERINO, writing for the majority in Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313 , 329 A.2d 224 (1974), whenever a numerical figure is selected to be the basis of a class, there is some degree of arbitrariness involved:

“Many other existing laws classify according to a legislatively selected number. A legislatively selected number of dollars divides those who may sue in a particular court from those who may not, a legislatively selected number of years divides those who may successfully be sued on a contract from those who may not; a legislatively selected number of days divides those who may have redress in the courts from those who may not.

Obviously, somewhere between the number one and the number ten thousand, the line of constitutional validity might be crossed, but we cannot say the line was crossed when the legislature selected ‘less than ten.’

*420 The legislature is to be given wide discretion in classifying, and any judicial inquiry into legislative classifications should not concern itself with the wisdom of the legislative choices so long as the choices are reasonably related to legitimate legislative objectives.

“A legislative classification need not be made with “mathematical nicety.” Inequalities may result as long as some reasonable basis is apparent for the classification.” Id. at 325 , 329 A.2d at 230 .

However, as he concluded in that case, I believe here the degree of arbitrariness does not reach the extent that would render the section constitutionally infirm.

. Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. -, No. 176, 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq.