Singer v. Sheppard

ROBERTS, Justice

(concurring).

I agree that section 301(a) of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 1 passes constitutional muster, but I desire to set forth my reasons for this conclusion.

Plaintiff’s primary argument is that section 301(a) violates article III, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I disagree. When that section is examined in the light of the circumstances of its adoption and the evil it was designed to remedy, 2 it is clear that it forbids the Legislature to place a maximum dollar limitation on the amount of damages that are otherwise recoverable in law. It does not limit the power of the Legislature to create or abolish causes of action; 3 to prescribe the es *416 sential elements of a cause of action; to specify what are recoverable items of damages or legally compensable losses; 4 or to provide under what circumstances a person has a cause of action and what items of damages are recoverable by him in those circumstances. 5 See Lewis v. Hollaban, 103 Pa. 425, 430 (1883). 6

Section 301(a) of the No-fault Act does not place a maximum dollar limitation on the amount of damages that are otherwise recoverable by a person injured in a motor vehicle accident. Rather, it specifies in what circumstances a person has a cause of action for injuries received in a motor vehicle accident and prescribes what items of damages are recoverable by him in those circumstances. Section 301(a) (1), (2) & (3) provides that a tortfeasor remains fully liable in tort under certain cir *417 cumstances in spite of the adoption of the Act. Section 301(a)(4) & (6) provides that a tortfeasor is liable for certain particular items of damages notwithstanding the application of the Act. Finally, section 301(a)(5), the keystone of the Act, provides that the item of damages styled “non-economic detriment” is recoverable from a tortfeasor only in a very limited, strictly defined set of circumstances. The salient feature of this arrangement is that, when the Act permits an injured person to maintain an action in tort, and specifies the items of damages that he is permitted to recover, he may recover those items of damages without monetary limit. Therefore, section 301(a) does not violate article III, section 18 of the Constitution.

In addition, upon my reading of the plaintiff’s brief, I must conclude, contrary to the conclusion of the opinion of the Chief Justice, that plaintiff has not advanced the argument that section 301(a) violates article I, section 11 of the Constitution. Therefore, I express no views on that issue. Finally, I agree with the opinion of the Chief Justice that section 301(a) does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment sustaining the constitutionality of section 301(a) and remanding the case to the Commonwealth Court.

Mr. Justice POMEROY joins in this opinion except to the extent that it expresses no view on the issue of a violation of article I, section 11 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania on the ground that the plaintiff has not advanced that argument.

. Act of July 19, 1974, P.L.-, No. 176, § 301(a), 40 P.S. § 1009.-301(a).

. See Lewis v. Hollaban, 103 Pa. 425 (1883); cf. Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 13 , 331 A.2d 198, 204-05 (1975); see also Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(l)-(4) (Supp.1974).

. See, e. g„ Act of January 28, 1972, P.L.-, No. 9, § 1, 35 P.S. § 10021 (Supp.1974) (abolishing cause of action in strict liability in tort for death or injury resulting from blood transfusions) (constitutionality sustained in Bartholomew v. Quakertown Hospital Ass’n, 25 Bucks L.Rptr. 250 (C.P.), aff’d per curiam, 231 Pa. Super. 724 , 327 A.2d 161 (1974)); Act of June 22, 1935, P.L. 450, § 2, 48 P.S. § 171 (1965) (abolishing cause of action for breach of contract to marry); see also, e. g., Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)).

. See, e. g., Act of October 2, 1959, P.L. 1023, § 4-402, 12A P.S. § 4-402 (1970) (bank’s liability to customer for wrongful dishonor of an item is limited to “actual damages proved”) (constitutionality of predecessor statute sustained in Bush v. Southwark Nat’l Bank, 8 Pa.D. & C. 27 (C.P.Philadelphia, 1926)); see also, e. g., Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90 , 320 A.2d 139 (1974) (permitting wife to recover for loss of husband’s consortium).

. See, e. g., Act of June 22, 1935, P.L. 450, § 1, as amended by Act of June 25, 1937, P.L. 2317, § 1, 48 P.S. § 170 (1965) (cause of action for alienation of affections permitted in narrowly limited circumstances only) (constitutionality sustained in McMullen v. Nannah, 49 Pa.D. & C. 516 (C.P.Beaver County, 1943)); see also, e. g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (abrogation of governmental immunity); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (abrogation of parental immunity); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401 , 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (plaintiff permitted to recover for personal injuries in spite of absence of contemporaneous impact); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (abrogation of charitable immunity).

. “The purpose of [the predecessor to article III, section 18] was to nullify, as far as possible, then existing legislation limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property .... [I]n endeavoring to determine the full scope and meaning of the section, it should be considered, as a whole in the light of the evil intended to be remedied by its adoption. It is very evident that the evil at which it was aimed was the obnoxious statutory limitation as to the amount of damages to be recovered.