The opinion
FERREN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
Appellant alleges, among other things, an accounting action at law, claiming that payments for his legal services under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) were reduced arbitrarily, in violation of his right to due process. Although appellant is not necessarily entitled to the statutory maximum rates or to payment for all the time claimed, Thompson v. District of Columbia, 407 A.2d 678, 681-82 (D.C.1979), he does have a sufficient property interest at stake, in seeking reasonable compensation under the CJA, to trigger the right to procedural due process. By statute, the attorney has “a legitimate claim of entitlement to” such compensation. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971); see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 , 601—02, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2700 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Camenisch v. United States, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 97, 100 , 553 F.2d 1271, 1273, 1276 (1976). The extent of his right to a hearing would be evaluated by reference to all the circumstances under the principles set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
I agree with my colleagues, however, that an attorney should take up his or her grievance initially with the trial judge who cut the CJA compensation request; in this context, a lawsuit alleging a due process violation will not state a claim unless the plaintiff-attorney avers that he or she has made an effort to get the judge to reconsider, and that the effort has failed. Cf. United States v. Smith, 633 F.2d 739, 740 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 , 101 S.Ct. 2047 , 68 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); United States v. D’Andrea, 612 F.2d 1386, 1387 (7th Cir.1980). There is no such averment here.