"Accordingly, there was no occasion, nor need, for the [Attorney Grievance] Commission to develop the facts[.]"
How later courts described this case
- "Accordingly, there was no occasion, nor need, for the [Attorney Grievance] Commission to develop the facts[.]"
- describing this Court’s “decision-making” relative to reinstatement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McDONALD, J.,
dissenting, in which BATTAGLIA and ADKINS, JJ., join.
I agree with 99% of the majority’s thorough and carefully considered opinion. And I sympathize with Mr. Cooke’s desire to resolve this lengthy proceeding. But, in my view, without further investigation, reinstatement is premature.
Under the rule governing reinstatements, Mr. Cooke would have the burden of proof by “clear and convincing” evidence as to the factual averments supporting his petition at any hearing concerning his petition. Maryland Rule 16 — 781(i). This is consistent with the requirement that an applicant for admission to the bar has the burden of proving his or her good moral character. Rule 5 of Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Maryland.
*696 Here the petition is based on an appellate reversal of Mr. Cooke’s criminal conviction. 1 Unlike the case of an acquittal, where the factfinder (whether judge or jury) makes an affirmative determination that the evidence does not establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate decision did not evaluate the strength of the evidence against Mr. Cooke but rather found that prosecutorial misconduct and judicial error may have affected the jury’s conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the charged offenses.
While the opinion of the intermediate appellate court in California summarizes the underlying conduct of Mr. Cooke and his co-defendant, that opinion is largely focused on the miscues of the prosecutor and judge, which are independent of Mr. Cooke’s conduct. What we do know from the appellate decision is that Mr. Cooke apparently entered into an agreement with the CEO of his corporate client essentially to kick back one-half his fee to the CEO’s wife. There apparently was some debate at trial as to whether the CEO’s wife actually performed services of benefit to the corporation. Even if she had performed such services, we do not know from the California appellate opinion what, if any, explanation was offered for the circuitous arrangement for compensating her for her services. Nor do we know whether there was any indication that this arrangement was disclosed to the nonprofit corporation’s board or in its public filings with the Internal Revenue Service. An attorney with a sophisticated practice such as Mr. Cooke would surely understand the significance of such disclosure. The answers to these questions might be revealing of his capacity to carry out the fiduciary duties that attorneys must perform.
It may be that once these questions and others were properly explored and evaluated in light of the good deeds Mr. Cooke has undertaken in the intervening years — and giving *697 him proper credit for coming forward and agreeing to disbarment in 2005 when he could have simply taken a suspension under Rule 16-772 — I too would be satisfied with “time served.” However, at present, the record is bare.
Judge BATTAGLIA and Judge ADKINS have indicated that they join this opinion.
. To their credit, both Mr. Cooke's counsel and Bar Counsel have acknowledged that even an attorney who has been acquitted of criminal charges may be disbarred for the conduct underlying those charges. See Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528 , 325 A.2d 718 (1974).