The opinion
TIMLIN, J., Concurring.
As the author of the lead opinion, I am of course in agreement with the views expressed therein. Nevertheless, I write separately to express a further basis for affirming the judgment, which basis addresses an important issue of law referenced in footnote 3 of the lead opinion. To repeat: Has California’s corpus delicti rule been abrogated by article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution (the “Right to Truth-in-Evidence”)? 1 My answer is: Yes.
The RTE provides: “Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.” The RTE, then, operates so as to ensure the admissibility of relevant evidence absent the existence of (a) a statutory exclusionary rule enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the California Legislature, or (b) some specifically denominated exception set forth within a California constitutional provision, or (c) some overriding principle of federal constitutional law.
*374 Clearly, admissions and confessions constitute “relevant evidence.” 2 (Indeed, as noted in the lead opinion, the corpus delicti rule arose, at least in part, as a judicially created exclusionary rule of evidence in precise recognition of the fact that jurors are apt to find admissions and confessions “too relevant.”) Further, the corpus delicti rule does not fall within the ambit of the specifically denominated exceptions set forth within the RTE, is not rooted in the California Constitution, and is not compelled by any overriding principle of federal constitutional law (Opper v. United, States of America (1954) 348 U.S. 84, 89-93 [ 99 L.Ed. 101, 106-109 , 75 S.Ct. 158 ]).
Thus, the tension between the corpus delicti rule (which restricts the admissibility of extrajudicial admissions and/or confessions by the criminal defendant—statements which admittedly constitute relevant evidence) and the RTE (which insists on the admissibility of all relevant evidence which does not fall within the reach of narrowly drawn exceptions) is apparent.
The best possible argument that can be made in favor of concluding that the corpus delicti rule has survived the adoption of the RTE is the simple fact that our Supreme Court has continued to recognize and apply the corpus delicti rule since the adoption of the RTE. 3 This argument, however, suffers the fatal flaw that none of the Supreme Court opinions that have recognized and applied the corpus delicti rule since the adoption of the RTE (or any other reported opinion, for that matter) has examined the issue of whether the corpus delicti rule has been abrogated by the RTE. 4 Thus, these opinions do not stand as authority for the proposition that the corpus delicti rule has survived the adoption of the RTE: “Language used in any opinion is of course to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein consid ered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ]; italics added.)
On the other side of the issue we are compelled by the Supreme Court’s statement that: “The intent of the electorate that both judicially created and *375 statutory rules restricting admission of relevant evidence in criminal cases be repealed except insofar as section 28(d) expressly preserves them is manifest.” (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081-1082 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 767 P.2d 619 ], italics added.) 5 In general terms, the constitutional mandate expressed in the RTE has been judicially developed and applied in a twofold manner: (1) Exclusionary rules of evidence which derive from or are inextricably intertwined with statutorily expressed substantive rights of the criminal defendant typically are found not to have been abrogated by the RTE (see, e.g., Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808-810 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ]); while (2) exclusionary rules of evidence which are intended primarily (if not solely) as a remedy for a violation of the criminal defendant’s substantive rights typically are found to have been abrogated by the RTE unless they are otherwise required by principles of federal constitutional law (see, e.g., In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 884-890 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ], and People v. May, supra, 44 Cal.3d 309, 315-320 ).
The corpus delicti rule does not fit neatly into either the “statutory substantive right” category of evidentiary rules or the “exclusionary remedy” category of evidentiary rules. However, it seems manifest to me that the corpus delicti rule more clearly belongs in the “exclusionary remedy” category of evidentiary rules because the corpus delicti rule historically has been developed and applied as a “remedy” to guard against the fact that confessions and admissions are unreliable and untrustworthy in certain circumstances. As stated in Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 390, 397 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 809 ]: “The corpus delicti rule was established by the courts to ‘protect a defendant from the possibility of fabricated testimony out of which might be wrongfully established both the crime and its perpetrator.’ (People v. Vertrees (1915) 169 Cal. 404, 409 [ 146 P. 890 ]; People v. DeMartini (1920) 50 Cal.App. 109,113 [ 194 P. 506 ]; People v. Cullen [1951] 37 Cal.2d at p. 625 [ 234 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Quicke (1969) 71 Cal.2d 502, 521 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 683 , 455 P.2d 787 ].) The corpus delicti rule arose from judicial concern that false confessions would lead to unjust convictions. [Citation.] Today’s judicial retention of the rule reflects the continued fear that confessions may be the result of either improper police activity or the mental *376 instability of the accused, and the recognition that juries are likely to accept confessions uncritically. [Citation.]” (See also Crisera, at pp. 1591-1592.) The corpus delicti rule is a prophylactic remedy, protecting the mentally unstable “confessor” from herself or himself and against the earlier mentioned inclination of jurors to believe a confession without conducting a close factual analysis of its trustworthiness.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the corpus delicti rule has been abrogated by the RTE.
The question remains: If the judicially created California corpus delicti rule has been abrogated, what remains in its place? The answer seems clear: Nothing. There simply is no underlying federal constitutional principle requiring a rule of corroboration or proof of the corpus delicti which would preclude a confession and/or an admission from being admitted into evidence as direct proof of the charges brought against the criminal defendant. 6
The general message of the RTE seems beyond argument: The wisdom vel non of adopting certain exclusionary rules of evidence has been taken from the hands of the judiciary and placed in the hands of the Legislature. The California Legislature, to date, has not seen fit (and, in all fairness, has not been shown the need) to adopt, pursuant to the two-thirds voting requirement of the RTE, a rule of evidence restricting the admissibility of confessions or admissions in order to protect against the potential of false confessions and unjust convictions. In my view, such an exclusionary rule, whether labeled a corpus delicti rule or a corroboration rule, is a reflection of literally centuries of wisdom accumulated by our judiciary and its historical antecedents to the effect that uncorroborated confessions and/or admissions are, in certain instances, untrustworthy and unreliable.
I encourage our Legislature, in light of the abrogation of California’s corpus delicti rule by the RTE, to consider and enact in its stead a meaningful and workable exclusionary rule of evidence to assure the admissibility of only reliable confessions. It may wish to start by looking at the federal rule, which rule recently has been critically analyzed by the majority in U.S. v. Lopez-Alvarez (9th Cir. 1992) 970 F.2d 583, 592 , with the following conclusion: “To summarize, under our reading of Opper and Wong Sun, the corroboration requirement is two-pronged: first, although the state need not introduce independent evidence of the corpus delicti in conformance with the traditional test, it must introduce sufficient evidence to establish that the *377 criminal conduct at the core of the offense has occurred. Second, it must introduce independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of the admissions, unless the confession is, by virtue of special circumstances, inherently reliable. Only when both these prongs are satisfied will a jury be ‘sufficiently justified’ in believing the truth of a criminal admission; only then will the evidence be deemed sufficient in a case in which the conviction depends in part on such admission.” (See also Crisera, at pp. 1594-1597.)
This constitutional provision was adopted by initiative vote in 1982 as a part of Proposition 8 (the “Victims’ Bill of Rights”). This “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision will hereinafter be referred to as “the RTE.”
Section 210 of the California Evidence Code defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
See, e.g.: People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 873-874 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 802 , 789 P.2d 983 ]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 403-404 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 731 , 802 P.2d 221 ]; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364-368 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ]; and People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 528-529 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 ],
This issue has been thoroughly and persuasively examined, however, in a recent Comment published in the California Law Review: Crisera, Reevaluation of the California Corpus Delicti Rule: A Response to the Invitation of Proposition 8 (1990) 78 Cal.L.Rev. 1571 (hereinafter cited as Crisera).
In another case (predating Harris), our Supreme Court opined that “the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28(d)” was “abrogating judicial decisions which had required the exclusion of relevant evidence solely to deter police misconduct in violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights under the state Constitution”—that is, “to dispense with exclusionary rules derived solely from the state Constitution.” (People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ].) The broader interpretation given the RTE by Harris (as compared with and to the interpretation suggested by May) is certainly more consistent with the actual language of the RTE. Nothing in the wording of the RTE itself suggests that its reach is limited to “exclusionary rules derived solely from the state Constitution.”
There are, of course, constitutional principles which preclude the admission of coerced (or otherwise “infirm”) confessions and/or admissions for such purposes—but these principles provide protections which are apart from those provided by the corpus delicti rule.